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STATEMENT OF
The {

^

S-ICMON

a!- l~ • urisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4™

103(2)(e) (2008), 1 ho Appellant S. Steven Maese, appeals convictions for a Patlerr of

and four counts of Exploiting Prostitution, third degree felonies in violations ol L fa,
Code Ann. § 7b-ItM 306(2).

STATEMENT O F ISSUES
P i HI IN I I III

" I "1 le State cl i,ai ged l'\ Ir T\ laese \ \ itl i foi ir c o\ n its of Exploitii Lg Prostit i ition.

Yet its charging documents factually described only one Exploiting Prostitution count.
The Probable Cause Statement inadequately notified Mr. Maese of the remaining
cm v-

:.i*

L

«i

* ^,.

•

'

culars. The trial court, however, failed to rule on his motion. Should the trial court have
compelled the State to produce a bill of particulars?

STANDARD OF REVIEW A N D PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

Under Utah law, this Court accords "a trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. Here, the question of the adequacy of the notice
given defendant is one of law/' 1 Mr. Maese preserved this issue by moving the trial
court for a bill of particulars. 2
POINT II.

Under Utah law, jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific crime

and as to each element of the crime. The Exploiting Prostitution and Pattern of Unlawful Activity statutes enumerate separate crimes through distinct actus reus alternatives.
Furthermore, the State claimed it presented evidence of more Exploiting Prostitution instances than it charged. Did the trial court err by failing to compel the State to elect the
offenses it would submit to the jury? Next, did the trial court properly instruct the jury:
•

that jury unanimity means unanimity to verdict only; and

•

that tacitly, jurors could individually pick and choose from actus reus alternatives in reaching its verdict.

Finally, did the trial court err by preventing Mr. Maese from entering juror statements
into evidence which proved his jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict?
STANDARD OF REVIEW A N D PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

"Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question of law which we
review for correctness/' 3 Furthermore, court rules are interpreted "by examining the
rule's plain language and resort to other methods only if the language is ambiguous/' 4

1

State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, f 8,139 P.3d 1066 (quotations and citation omitted).

2

R. at 167.

3

State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, f 11, 62 P.3d 444.

~

2

~

Mr. Maese failed to preserve the election issue, but election is a question of law and
its lacking has been deemed a manifest injustice.5
Though raised in his Motion for Arrest of Judgment, Mr. Maese failed to preserve
his grievance with the trial court's initial jury unanimity instruction at trial and raises it
as plain error and manifest-injustice on appeal. The trial court's supplemental jury instruction was objected to 6 and the Utah R. Evid. 606(b) argument was raised in Mr.
Maese's Motion for Arrest of Judgment.7
POINT III. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to satisfy required elements of Mr.
Maese's charged crimes where the State failed to introduce evidence of a "house of
prostitution," an "inmate," "prostitute" status, an "understanding," and a "prostitution
business," all necessary elements of Exploiting Prostitution, and where the only "transporting" evidence was inherently improbable?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction."8 Mr. Maese preserved this issue in his Motion for Arrest of Judgment.9

4

State v. Quinonez-Gaiton, 2002 UT App 273, f 11, 54 P.3d 139 (alterations omitted).

5

State v. Hilberg, 61 P. 215,217 (Utah 1900).

6

R. at 862-73.

7

R. at 345.

8

State v. Robbins, 2006 UT App 324, f 7,142 P.3d 589.

9

R. at 369.
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POINT IV.

Utah law requires crimes to be prosecuted by information and in the spe-

cific. Here, the State charged Mr. Maese with a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, but failed
to enumerate one of its alternatives. The missing alternative was published in jury instructions however. Therefore, did the trial court err by giving the jury an instruction
which allowed them to convict Mr. Maese of a crime he was not charged with violating?
STANDARD OF REVIEW A N D PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

Under Utah law, "Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question
of law which we review for correctness." 10 Mr. Maese preserved this issue in his Motion
for Arrest of Judgment. 11 If this Court finds Mr. Maese's objection untimely, he raises it
as plain error or under Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e)'s "manifest injustice" 12 exception. He demonstrates that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood
of a more favorable outcome." 13

R U L E S , STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
This Court's interpretation of the following rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions
is important to the issues on appeal and their full texts are attached at ADDENDUM A:
RULES

•

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(b), 4(e), 4(h), 12(e), and 12(f) (2008);

•

Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) (2008).

™ State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT118, f 11, 62 P.3d 444.
11

R. at 358.

12

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e) (2008).

« State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 26,128 P.3d 1179.

~ A ~

STATUTES

• Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1301, 76-10-1305, 76-10-1603 (2006).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12.
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 13.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 5, 2008, Mr. Maese was charged with a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603; four counts of Exploiting Prostitution, third degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(2);
and Money Laundering, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-101904(1). Mr. Maese was bound over on all charges.
Following a two day jury trial, on July 11, 2008, Mr. Maese was convicted of four
counts of Exploiting Prostitution and the single count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity.
He was acquitted of Money Laundering.14
On January 26, 2009, Mr. Maese was sentenced to a term of one-to-fifteen years in
the State Prison for the second degree felony conviction, and a term of zero-to-five years
for each of the four third degree felony convictions. The court suspended the prison
terms but required Mr. Maese to serve sixty days in jail, and placed him on probation.15
Previously, he filed a timely Motion for Arrest of Judgment, which the court denied.16

14

R. at 313.

15

R. at 808.

16

R. at 323; R. at 733.
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STATEMENT O F FACTS
Steven Maese had worked for Wells Fargo as a business banker and specialized in marketing.17 Tiffany Curtis had worked as an erotic escort and knew the inside of the escort
industry. 18 In late 2004 the escort agency Curtis worked for, Cinderella's, was put up
for sale and she wanted to buy it.19 Knowing Mr. Maese's business background, she
asked him to review its books.20 He did and told Curtis it would cost less to start an
agency from scratch.21 Mr. Maese and Curtis would have specific roles. He handled advertising, vendors, IT and similar business decisions, while she primarily interacted
with the escorts and clients;22 answering phone calls and directing escorts to their various appointments.23 Mr. Maese was concerned about operating an escort agency legally
but Curtis assured him that she made good money while escorting without performing
sex acts, without breaking the law.24 So was born The Doll House escort agency.25
Mr. Maese took steps to insure that The Doll House was established and operated
legally. Mr. Maese and Curtis hired an attorney to set up the business properly;26 he al17

R. at 319-20 (Tr. 109:8:-10, July 10, 2008; Tr. 261:6-7, July 11, 2008.).

18

R. at 319 (Tr. 109:14-19, 70:2-3, July 10, 2008.).

^ R. at 319 (Tr. 110:3-4, July 10, 2008.).
20

R. at 319 (Tr. 110:7-11, July 10, 2008.).

21

R. at 319 (Tr. 110:12-14, July 10, 2008.).

22

R. at 319 (Tr. 70:14-16,136:23-25, July 10, 2008.).

23

R. at 319-320 (Tr. 89:3-5:10, July 10, 2008; the word "send" and "sent" occur 37 times
throughout the trial transcript.).

24

R. at 319 (Tr. 108:12-109:7, July 10, 2008.).

25

R. at 319 (Tr. 69:15-20, July 10, 2008.).

26

R. at 319 (Tr. 110:17-19, July 10, 2008.).
~6~

so paid attorneys to teach escorts how to work within the law, to prevent prostitution. 27
Moreover, escorts were told that to avoid being arrested, they should not have sex for
money. 28 Mr. Maese never required escorts to perform sex acts. 29 Escorts were required
to be punctual, be congenial, and completely disrobe. 30 These requirements, and especially the nonrequirements, were clearly communicated to all escorts. 31
But on April 5, 2006, on suspicion of a Class B misdemeanor business license violation, ten Sheriffs Deputies executed a search warrant on Curtis's home. 32 While typically executed in secret, someone tipped off the press, informing them of the warrant's
execution. A news crew was present before deputies breached the door. 33 Six months
later, on October 5, 2006, Tiffany Curtis and S. Steven Maese were charged with Money
Laundering, a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, and four counts of Exploiting Prostitution.
Yet the only factual details set forth in the Amended Information were the place and
time of the counts. All charges occurred at Curtis's home: 7567 S. 2160 East, and in and
around Salt Lake County, State of Utah; on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006
(Curiously, the Doll House began operations well after July, on December 16, 200434).35

27

R. at 319-20 (Tr. 72:3-73:10, July 10, 2008; Tr. 323:21-324:10, July 11, 2008.).

28

R. at 320 (Tr. 161:4-9, July 11, 2008.).

29

R. at 320 (Tr. 146:13-17,159:19-24, 270:16-18, July 11, 2008).

30

R. at 320 (Tr. 271:15-19,180:34-181:21, July 11, 2008.).

31

R. at 319 (Tr. 106:2-8, July 10,2008.).

32

R. at 319 (Tr. 17:23-18:18, July 10, 2008.).

33

R. at 319 (Tr. 47:11-23, July 10, 2008.).

34

R. at 320 (Tr. 265:22-23, July 11, 2008.).

35

R. at 8-13 (The Amended Information is attached at ADDENDUM B).

~

7

~

Counts II through V, the Exploiting Prostitution charges, used identical language.36 The
accompanying probable cause statement applied to both Mr. Maese and Curtis. It alleged that through The Doll House escort agency, "MEESE [sic] and CURTIS aided and
encouraged prostitution../ 7 It also contained seven subparagraphs from initialed witnesses. Five of the seven subparagraphs implicated Curtis as the sole criminal actor.37
First, witness A.F. alleged that Curtis encouraged her to perform oral sex on clients
and that Curtis would refrain from giving her appointments if she failed to pay kickbacks. A.F. stated that Mr. Maese threatened her if she quit working. Second, H.T. frequently prostituted herself and alleged that she always gave money to Curtis. Mr.
Maese's name is absent from H.T/s statement. Third, H.R. also frequently prostituted
herself and alleged that Curtis and Mr. Maese offered her an attorney if she was ever arrested. Fourth, J.H. alleged that Curtis told her clients always wanted sex and that she
did prostitute herself. J.H. recalled a specific instance where she paid a $200 kickback to
Curtis personally. She regularly paid Curtis a 20% kickback. J.H. also said Mr. Maese offered her an attorney. Fifth, T.N. alleged that she regularly paid a 20% kickback to Curtis. Moreover, Curtis frequently asked her to perform specific sex acts with particular
customers, because other escorts were unwilling to. 38
Only N.F. (Nicole Fernandez) and D.T/s (Danielle Thomas) statements accused Mr.
Maese of crimes. N.F said Mr. Maese told her when specific customers wanted specific
sex acts. She refused. But despite being given few appointments because of her refusal,
36

R. at 9-10 (Amended Information, Counts II-V).

37

R. at 11-13 (Probable Cause Statement).

38

R. at 11-13 (Probable Cause Statement at 15.).
~8~

Mr. Maese threatened her when she left The Doll House. D.T. said she was asked by Mr.
Maese to obtain condoms for a customer and to "work something out/' 3 9
The State's Amended Information failed to differentiate between counts ascribed to
Curtis or Mr. Maese. 40 Then, at Preliminary Hearing, the State claimed it presented evidence of criminal episodes exceeding the four Exploiting Prostitution counts charged. 41
And although Curtis eventually pled guilty to two counts of Attempted Exploitation of
Prostitution, the State failed to amend their information a second time. 42 Accordingly,
Mr. Maese moved the trial court for a bill of particulars, but the trial court never ruled. 43
*

*

*

At trial, the State introduced substantial testimony that its witnesses prostituted themselves on their own initiative. Allyson Jensen and Jennifer Harris testified they prostituted themselves 50 percent of the time; 44 Heather Twede testified she had sex for
money "maybe a third of the time/' 4 5 Danielle Thomas testified she prostituted herself
"at least 60 to 70 percent" 46 of the time. Heather Wright testified she prostituted herself
"Probably at least 90 percent of the calls." 47 Nicole Fernandez said that she "had sex

39

R. at 11-13 (Probable Cause Statement at \5.).

40

R. at 8-13 (Amended Information and Probable Cause Statement combined.).

41

R. at 81 (Tr. 137:6-11, April 3, 2007.).

42

R. 319 (Tr. 74:24-75:6, July 10, 2008.).

43

R. at 716.

44

R. at 319-320 (Tr. 125:3, July 10,2008; 151:18-23, Tr. July 11,2008.).

45

R. at 320 (Tr. 167:13, July 11, 2008.).

46

R. at 320 (Tr. 183:19, July 11, 2008.).

47

R. at 320 (Tr. 210:24, July 11,2008.).
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with all of them."48 And while all escorts had plea agreements in place,49 each failed to
testify that Mr. Maese required or pressured them to prostitute.50 Escorts rarely spoke
to Mr. Maese regarding clients and appointments; they generally spoke with Curtis.51
On each appointment, escorts were required to collect $145 from the client; $95 paid
to the company and $50 to the escort.52 Escorts were required to collect this fee within
the first ten minutes of the appointment, before initiating any services.53 This prevented
clients from withholding money upon learning that sex acts were not for sale.54 Subsequently, escorts would negotiate fees for any additional services provided to clients.55
Shower shows, lap dances, back rubs, and dirty talk were such optional services.56
From these additional services fees, escorts often tipped Curtis personally—not the
business —a portion of their earnings.57 This was considered a gratuity for sending an
escort on the call.58 Although one escort testified she saw all monies comingled,59 Curtis

48

R. at 320 (Tr. 240:21, July 11, 2008.).

49

DEFENSE EXHIBITS 31-34.

50

R. at 319-20 (Tr. 114:7-11, July 10,2008; Tr. 153:13-24,160:15-24,174:19-25, 201:4-6,
218:19-219:16, July 11, 2008.).

51

R. at 320 (Tr. 224:2-225-2, July 11,2008;

52

R. at 319 (Tr. 88:17-21, July 10, 2008.).

53

R. at 320 (Tr. 148:2-10, July 11, 2008.).

54

R. at 320 (Tr. 159:25-160:2, 274:11-23, July 11, 2008.).

55

R. at 320 (Tr. 147:24-148:16, July 10,2008.).

56

R. at 320 (Tr. 267:2-3, July 11,2008.).

57

R. at 319 (Tr. 88:22-89:2,136:1-8, July 10,1008.).

58

R. at 320 (Tr. 182:4-18, July 11,2008.).

59

R. at 320 (Tr. 222:8, July 10,2008.).
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herself testified that she kept the tips and The Doll House never shared in or received
any tip money. 60 Importantly, Mr. Maese never received or shared in any tip money. 61
On occasion, tales of the escorts' additional services appeared on The Erotic Review
("TER"). The Erotic Review is a nationwide website for the posting and reading of escort,
massage parlor, and gentlemen's clubs reviews. 62 TER's gossip, however, is posted anonymously and cannot be verified as true or fictitious.63
TER contained stories alleging Doll House escorts engaged in sex acts. Mr. Maese
read some of these various tales. 64 Furthermore, Curtis and Mr. Maese discussed stories
they had read on TER65 and jointly posted fictitious stories containing sex acts. 66
During a company meeting, Mr. Maese shared printed examples of good and bad
reviews with escorts, but any references to sex acts were redacted. 67 As Curtis recalled,
bad reviews were given for behavior such as, "A girl talking on her cell phone with her
boyfriend; a girl refusing to be nice, to even you know, refusing to get naked, any number of things can cause a bad review.. ." 68 not necessarily for failing to perform sex acts.

60

R. at 319 (Tr. 105:13-21, Tr. 138:4-6, July 10, 2008.).

61

R. at 320 (Tr. 277:19-278:10, July 11, 2008.).

62

R. at 319 (Tr. 16:18-21, July 10, 2008.).

63

R. at 319 (Tr. 43:1-44:13, July 10, 2008; Tr. 106:9-107:3, July 11, 2008.).

64

R. at 320 (Tr. 311:4-9, July 11, 2008.).

65

R. at 319 (Tr. 83:14-17, July 10, 2008.).

66

R. at 319 (Tr. 116:15-117:5, July 10, 2008.).

67

R. at 319 (Tr. 24:3-27:9, Jul 10, 2008; Tr. 114:17-21, July 10,2008.).

68

R. at 319 (Tr. 114:23-115:1, July 10, 2008.).
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Beyond TER, Mr. Maese participated in, or was present at, various conversations
with escorts. Mr. Maese was present when an escort spontaneously declared she had
performed oral sex on a client.69 He attended a bachelor party where two escorts performed oral sex on each other.70 An escort also told Mr. Maese she had been raped;71
upon hearing this, he offered to call the police himself— on behalf of the woman—but
the woman declined.72 Mr. Maese told an escort that the $300 per hour she was charging was unreasonable, yet the escort never explicitly referenced sex73 saying, "sex
wasn't said/' 74 Curtis also testified that the escort never explicitly discussed sex.75
Witnesses also testified that Mr. Maese spoke with them regarding specific appointments. Danielle Thomas, who was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and at the
time of trial was being treated for it by a psychiatrist, a therapist and a medical doctor
with Proflexor, Abilify, Xanax and Ambien,76 testified that she was directed to buy condoms for a client and to make him happy.77 Yet she also remembered telling police "I
really fucking hate his ass. Fm talking like, like I really fucking hate him.,/78 And "I will
take [The Doll House] down just to fucking get a good kick, ha, ha, about it... Yeah, I
69

R. at 319 (Tr. 88:11-13, July 10, 2008.).

70

R. at 319 (Tr. 97:24, July 10, 2008.).

71

R. at 320 (Tr. 168:19-171:22, July 11, 2008.).

72

R. at 320 (Tr. 173:11-15, July 11, 2008.).

73

R. at 320 (Tr. 188:9:10, July 11, 2008.).

74

R. at 320 (Tr. 202:12-13, July 11, 2008.).

75

R. at 319 (Tr. 103:18-22, July 10, 2008, "Okay, I can't say that...").

76

R. at 320 (Tr. 204:19-21, July 11, 2008; Tr. 206:19-20, July 11, 2008.).

77

R. at 320 (Tr. 186:20-21, July 11, 2008.).

78

R. at 320 (Tr. 203:7-8, July 11, 2009.).
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want to shut him down. I want to ruin his life just because he's a cocksuck."79 Expectedly, she admitted having a "vendetta" against Mr. Maese.80
Nicole Fernandez also disliked Mr. Maese. Her testimony completely contradicted
her police interview wherein she confessed to prostituting herself with her personal
clients, but not with The Doll House clients.81 At trial, she stated that Mr. Maese drove
her to an appointment and was told it was "not just a lap dance or dancing or anything," and that the customer usually paid "like $400."82 Subsequently, when being
picked up, she told him she had performed oral sex, and "you need to be a little more
liberal than that" was the reply.83 Like Thomas, she told police, "I hate him, he's a little
fucker, you know, and even on bad people I don't wish bad things but I just wish you
know, I'll tell you so that he can get his everything gone."84
Lastly, Ally son Jensen, who left The Doll House in December of 2005,85 testified that
in early April, 2006, her mother received a letter.86 Curtis attributed the authorship to
Mr. Maese.87 The letter accused Jensen of being a prostitute and included photos of her
from the Internet. The letter also directed the reader to her reviews on TER.

79

R. at 320 (Tr. 203:25-204:2, 204:8-9, July 11, 2008.).

80

R. at 320 (Tr. 205:16-18, July 11, 2008.).

81

R. at 320 (Tr. 245:5-249:8, July 11, 2008.).

82

R. at 320 (Tr. 233:18-19, 234:5-20, July 11, 2008.).

83

R. at 320 (Tr. 235:18, 236:4, 235:21-25, July 11, 2008.).

84

R. at 320 (Tr. 248:22-25, July 11, 2008.).

85

R. at 319 (Tr. 121:6, July 10, 2008.).

86

R. at 319 (Tr. 133:2-9, July 10, 2008.).

87

R. at 319 (Tr. 99:15-17, July 10, 2008.).
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In his closing argument, the Deputy District Attorney argued that Danielle Thomas's
testimony proved "one specific instance of conduct where he exploited a prostitute as
it's defined under Utah law." 88 He then argued that the letter to Allyson Jensen's mother proved an Exploiting Prostitution count and that Mr. Maese "has absolutely encouraged or induced another to remain a prostitute." 89 Next he argued that Nicole
Fernandez's testimony proved Mr. Maese, "Did transport a person into or within the
state for the purpose of prostitution." 90 Continuing, the prosecutor argued that Heather
Twede's rape established Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution because "they still took that
agency fee despite what had happened." 9 1 No evidence was presented that Twede paid
The Doll House, much less Mr. Maese, any fee from this incident.
Next, the prosecutor rhetorically asked the jury if Mr. Maese "procure[d] inmates for
a house of prostitution or place women into prostitution? Absolutely. That was the
whole purpose of that website and that was the whole purpose of the advertising to
bring those girls in." 92 It was then nebulously argued that each interview Mr. Maese
participated in—in conjunction with advertising—was a distinct instance where Mr.
Maese encouraged women to "become or remain a prostitute." 93 Regarding Jennifer
Harris, the prosecutor argued that "she had allowed sexual conduct and she did in

88

R. at 320 (Tr. 347:25-348:2, July 11, 2008.).

89

R. at 320 (Tr. 348:15-19, July 11, 2008.).

9

° R. at 320 (Tr. 351:15-19, July 11, 2008.).

91

R. at 320 (Tr. 352:10-14, July 11, 2008.).

92

R. at 320 (Tr. 375:12-15, July 11, 2008.).

93

R. at 320 (Tr. 375:17-18, July 11, 2008.).
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about 50 percent of the cases and she did about 300 appointments. That's 150 right
there."94 As the State concluded it argued, "We've shown actually more than the necessary charges in terms of the separate instances of exploitation of a prostitute."95 In total,
the State argued it proved Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution at least 155 times.
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The Utah Constitution requires the State to provide a physical copy of

charges against a defendant with sufficient factual details to enable an adequately prepared defense. The information charging Mr. Maese failed to adequately articulate acts
constituting crimes; therefore he requested a bill of particulars. No bill was provided.
Therefore, the central question is: Factually and specifically for each count, what was
Mr. Maese charged with? The State failed to answer this question and the record shows
that even with hindsight, it is unanswerable. The State's failure to factually illuminate
the charges gave it nearly unfettered latitude in presenting its case. Immune from variance, the State's moving target prevented Mr. Maese from offering a cogent defense.
This structural error merits reversal and remand.
POINT II.

Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific crime and as to each ele-

ment of the crime. First, both Exploiting Prostitution and Pattern of Unlawful Activity
define multiple actus reus alternatives under which a jury may convict; this means both
statutes define multiple crimes. Second, the State claimed it presented evidence of over
155 Exploiting Prostitution instances from which to convict. This convergence jeopar94

R. at 320 (Tr. 375:23-25, July 11, 2008.).

95

R. at 320 (Tr. 380:21-23, July 11, 2008.).
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dized jury unanimity by providing the jury with limitless theories to convict Mr. Maese
under. The jurors could pick-and-choose from the evidence to fulfill each count. This
should have alarmed the trial court. It needed to give a detailed and specific jury unanimity instruction or compel the State to elect which specific acts it would submit to
the jury for deliberation. Instead, it issued a unanimity instruction that applied to verdict only and was legally incorrect. Next, the jury's question from deliberations reminded the trial court that unanimity was compromised. This should have prompted a
detailed jury unanimity instruction in response. Lastly, Utah R. Evid. 606(b) permits
statements that prove a jury has rendered an invalid verdict. Therefore, the trial court
should have considered juror statements proving a nonunanimous verdict. These errors
deprived Mr. Maese of jury unanimity and warrant reversal and remand.
POINT III.

The State must prove all elements of an offense including mens rea and at-

tendant circumstances. In this case, the State failed to introduce evidence of a "house of
prostitution/ 7 an "inmate/ 7 "prostitute" status, an "understanding/ 7 and a "prostitution
business" all attendant circumstances. Moreover, the State failed to introduce evidence
of intentional mens rea, repeatedly arguing that it had proved knowledge only. Additionally, the State's witness's testimony regarding an incident of "transporting" was inherently improbable. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the evidence at trial
greatly deviated from the allegations charged in the Amended Information. For all these
reasons, the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the convictions.
POINT IV.

Utah Law requires informations to charge by statute or by stating in con-

cise terms the definition of the offense. The information charging Mr. Maese with a Pat-

~16~

tern of Unlawful Activity failed to enumerate the statute's last subsection. Yet Mr.
Maese's jury instructions recited the final subsection, allowing the jury to convict him of
a crime, a distinct actus reus, that he was not charged with. The trial court erred by issuing this jury instruction and this error should have been obvious to the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. The State failed to provide Mr. Maese with adequate notice of the
charges against him and the trial court erred by failing to compel the
State to provide a bill of particulars.
The risk of losing liberty is a formidable jeopardy. Therefore, both the Federal and Utah
constitutions grant an accused the fundamental right to know the nature of the offense
with which he is charged.96 This "requires the prosecution to state the charge with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime
and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense/'97 In State v. Wilcox, the Utah Supreme Court held that if "the elements of the crimes are covered by the
factual allegations"98 within the information, the State has provided adequate notice.99
Importantly, adequate notice must be provided in specific documents. In State v.
Bernards, this Court held that, "The probable cause statement... and Amended Informa-

96

State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 17 n. 1, 94 P.3d 186, Citing Utah Const., Article
I, Section 12, and U.S. Const, amend. VI; State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1031 (Utah
1991), Citing Utah and U.S. Const. Due Process Clauses.

97

State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,115,166 P.3d 626.

98

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1033 (Utah 1991).

99

State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100,104 (Utah 1988); State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah
1985).
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tion, should be considered as part of the notice given Defendant/'100 A bill of particulars
also contributes to adequate notice. Other documents, such as discovery and evidence
from pretrial hearings, specifically, have been excluded from adequate notice, however.
In State v. Bell, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's assertion that "materials
provided to [the defendant] through pretrial discovery"101 constituted adequate notice:
[W]e reject the implication of the State's argument... that [the defendant] had
pretrial access to a mass of various items of information from which, one can
conclude in hindsight, [the defendant] could have gleaned the State's theories for
the essential elements of the crimes charged. For this Court to accept such an argument. .. would negate the accused's constitutional right... to "have a copy" of
a document setting out in clear terms "the nature and cause of the accusation."102
Moreover, discovery is precluded from contributing towards adequate notice because it is beyond the record's scope. In Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co., the
Utah Supreme Court held that "the findings of all triers of fact, either court or jury,
must be based upon testimony of witnesses or other evidence made a part of the
record/'103 Accordingly, any findings of fact based on discovery are invalid; without a
foundation, facts found by speculation are clearly erroneous.
Therefore, the Bell Court then established a three part test to determine if a defendant has received adequate notice: (1) whether the information itself is detailed enough
to give a defendant sufficient notice of the charges; (2) whether a defendant exercises

100

State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,117,166 P.3d 626.

101

State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100,107 (Utah 1988).

102

Ibid.

103

Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co., 503 P.2d 850, 852 (Utah 1972) (emphasis
added).
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the right to seek more particular notice by requesting a bill of particulars under Utah R.
Crim. P. 4(e); and (3) whether the State met the burden of providing adequate notice.104
Upon establishing deficient notice, the Utah Supreme Court held that the error is
structural, with prejudice presumed. Again, in State v. Bell, the Utah Supreme Court
noted "the record cannot reveal how adequate notice of the charges would have affected the actions of defense counsel, either in preparing for trial or in presenting the
case to the jury"105 and therefore the State's burden is to prove the error was harmless.
Applying the Bell test here shows that the State deprived Mr. Maese of adequate notice. The Information and Probable Cause Statement, considered in concert, fail to provide Mr. Maese with sufficient factual details for the charged crimes. Mr. Maese
requested a bill of particulars in conformity with Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e) yet the State never produced a bill and the trial court failed to compel it to do so.
A. The Amended Information charging Mr. Maese failed to provide him with the
sufficient notice and factual detail required to adequately prepare a defense.
1. Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute defines five conceptually distinct crimes.
Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute defines five separate crimes, not merely one crime
which may be committed in several different ways. This is because Exploiting Prostitution provides "alternatives for the actus reus of the charged crime."106 Those five conceptually distinct acts are:

104

State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100,104-05 (Utah 1988).

105

State v. Bellf 770 P.2d 100,106 (Utah 1988) (quotations, brackets, and citations omitted).

106

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,565 (Utah 1987).
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(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of prostitution for one who would be an inmate;
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person into or within this state, with the purpose to promote that
person's engaging in prostitution, procuring or paying for the transportation
with that purpose;
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute share the proceeds of
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to
share therein; or
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business. 107
These alternatives are discrete criminal activities; separate and distinct actus reus elements constituting separate and distinct crimes. Accordingly:
In subsection (a) the actor succeeds in explicitly recruiting an individual for a
house of prostitution as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1);
In subsection (b) the actor's speech or conduct encourages a person to change status from nonprostitute to prostitute or to remain in prostitute status;
In subsection (c) the actor must physically transport a person, or pay for transportation, with the intent that the person transported will engage in prostitution
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(1);
In subsection (d) the actor, before sharing, agrees to take profits from prostitution
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(1) and then shares in those profits;
In subsection (e) the actor operates a house of prostitution as defined by Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1), or an explicit prostitution business, and is episodic.
Because the Exploiting Prostitution statute defines five separate crimes, and Mr.
Maese is entitled "to be charged with a specific crime/' 1 0 8 the State cannot generally cite

107

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1) (2006).
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the statute to provide adequate notice. Yet despite supplementing the Information with
a probable cause statement, the State failed to adequately notify Mr. Maese.
2. The Probable Cause Statement details two crimes, only one qualifying as Exploiting Prostitution.
The State deprived Mr. Maese of the factual basis for the charges against him. The State
charged Mr. Maese via an Amended Information which recited, verbatim, Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity, 109 Money Laundering, 110 and Exploiting Prostitution 111 statues, but no facts. The accompanying Probable Cause Statement 112 detailed only two
factual episodes that allege Mr. Maese committed crimes.
•

... N.F. describes one particular instance where MEESE (sic) ordered her to an
appointment where the customer wanted sex. N.F. tried not to have sex, and
the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then called N.F. and told her
"B*tch, you're gonna have to make it work/ 7 ... N.F. states she was not given
many appointments because she would not have sex with clients. 113

This witness clearly asserts that she is not a prostitute ("she would not have sex with
clients/ 7 ) and accuses Mr. Maese of making statements that could reasonably be inferred
as encouraging her to change her status to prostitute.
•

D.T.... states that she would have sex for money while working for the Doll
House. D.T. describes on one particular occasion being asked by a customer
to have sexual intercourse for $200.00 without a condom. When D.T. refused,
the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then got on the phone and

108

Orem City v. Martineau, 2006 UT App 136, \ 6,135 P.3d 884.

109

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603, sans subsection (4) (2006).

110

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (2006).

111

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1).

112

Attached at

113

R. at 11 (Probable Cause Statement at \% § a.).
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told D.T. to drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and "work
something out." 114
The witness is a prostitute and accuses Mr. Maese of asking her to buy condoms and
telling her to "work something out." These facts fail to satisfy any Exploiting Prostitution alternative but qualify as a crime under Aiding Prostitution's 115 "procures or attempts to procure a prostitute for a patron" alternative.
3. The Probable Cause Statement's remaining allegations fail to articulate crimes.
The remaining allegations range from benign to scandalous, yet none articulate crimes.
Overall, the State's document recounts legal conduct and cannot substantiate Counts I
through V of the Information. The allegations are:
•

A.F... states that MEESE (sic) threatened her if she did not continue working
for Doll House. 116

A threat by itself is not illegal. This statement fails to inform Mr. Maese if the State
alleges he threatened to sue A.F. for breach of contract, or if he threatened to key A.F/s
car. Mr. Maese cannot divine the factual basis of any crime from this language, let alone
Exploiting Prostitution's necessary elements.
•

H.T.... states she did have sex with clients for money, and that she always
paid CURTIS out at the cottonwood address following the appointments. 117

This paragraph fails to allege any crime against Mr. Maese.

114

R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at f 5, § f.).

115

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304(b) (2006).

116

R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at Tf5, § b.).

117

R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at 15, § c ) .
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• H.R. states that MEESE (sic) and CURTIS told her that if she ever got arrested
for prostitution, to not say anything, and they would provide a lawyer for
her.11*
The Exploiting Prostitution statute does not prohibit Mr. Maese from informing H.R.
of her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Similarly, providing an attorney to an
individual in police custody does not demonstrate an Exploiting Prostitution element.
• J.H... states that MEESE [sic] told her they would pay for a lawyer if she
would not talk to police. J.H. states that money was paid out to CURTIS
and/or MEESE [sic] at the Cottonwood address every time.119
Again, offering to pay for J.H/s legal fees fails to constitute criminal conduct. Next,
paying money owed in the course of employment as a licensed escort is legal and expected. The document may imply that Mr. Maese operated a sexually oriented business
without a license, but the factual basis for Exploiting Prostitution is nonexistent.
• T.N... states that in practice the girls frequently told CURTIS and MEESE [sic]
of the specific sex acts they perform.120
This hearsay statement—the witness alleges others told Mr. Maese about sex acts —
fails to constitute a crime under Utah law. Hearing someone recount a crime, allegedly
committed by a third party, is not a crime. The Utah Supreme Court has long held that
"the mere presence where a crime is being committed... without such an intent to join
therein, being shown, is not sufficient to find that one is an accomplice/7121

118

R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at | 5 , § d.).

119

R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at f 5, § e.).

120

R. at 13 (Probable Cause Statement at | 5 , § g.).

121

State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977).
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The State's remaining allegations pertain to Tiffany Curtis. But conduct ascribed to
Curtis cannot be charged to Mr. Maese —the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution prohibits guilt by association. 122
*

*

*

The State's Information and Probable Cause Statement are too vague to provide Mr.
Maese with sufficient notice of his charges because they fail to enumerate "the elements
of the crimes [by] factual allegations;" 123 these documents lack sufficient relevant facts.
Furthermore, the Information and Probable Cause Statement cannot be reconciled
because they fail to provide a nexus —customarily done through specific times, places,
or participants —between counts in the Information and paragraphs in the Probable
Cause Statement. Counts II through V use identical generic statutory language as a descriptor and a vast 22 month ("July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006") time frame. This
vague window is not the "best information the prosecution has... that may be useful in
helping to fix a date, time or place of the alleged offenses"124 because, as evidenced by
the Probable Cause Statement, the State had temporal windows as short as two months.
This served as an effective strategy to preserve the State's case from haphazard witnesses, but fails as an exception for denying Mr. Maese adequate notice.
4. In this case, adequate notice exceptions are inapplicable.
When the State predicates charges on adult witnesses, notice exceptions are inapplicable. The Utah Supreme Court has "recognized that there are notice problems, especially

122

Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11,18-19 (1966).

123

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1033 (Utah 1991).

124

State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, f 27,106 P.3d 734 (quotations and citation omitted).
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as to the date, place, and time, inherent in prosecutions based on the testimony of very
young victims,"125 therefore the Court has "been less vigorous in requiring specificity as
to time and place when young children are involved than would usually be the case
where an adult is involved/7126 In this case, Mr. Maese's youngest accuser is in her mid
20s; his oldest is nearly 35. These witnesses do not enjoy the same latitude as an eight
year old; and even in child abuse cases, facts are connected to counts by using initials.
Admittedly, "there are few ironclad rules for determining the adequacy of notice
beyond the requirement that the elements of the offense be alleged."127 But here, the
State's Information and Probable Cause Statement are woefully inadequate in alleging
facts for the crimes charged. Therefore, Mr. Maese satisfies the Bell test's first prong.
B. Mr. Maese sought more particular notice by requesting a bill of particulars.
On May 27, 2008, Mr. Maese filed his Motion for Bill of Particulars. Filed almost 45 days
prior to Mr. Maese's trial date, the State opposed, but failed to object to, Mr. Maese's
Motion. On July 7, 2008, the Trial Court heard oral arguments regarding this Motion.
Mr. Maese satisfied the Bell test's second prong.
C. The State failed to provide Mr. Maese with a bill of particulars and the trial
court failed to rule on his Motion.
The State failed to provide Mr. Maese with a bill of particulars and the trial court failed
to rule on Mr. Maese's Motion. These facts satisfy the Bell test's third prong. The trial
court's failure to rule on Mr. Maese's Motion merits attention however.

125

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1032 (Utah 1991).

126

Id. at 1033.

127

Id. at 1032.
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1. The Trial Court erred by not ruling on Mr. Maese's Motion for Bill of Particulars, and then created a post hoc rationalization to justify its error.
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, pretrial motions must be ruled on before trial:
A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings
on the record. 128
Rule 12(e) exists because, as the Utah Supreme Court reasoned, "issues are for the
trial court to decide and... the findings of fact must reveal how the court resolved each
material issue." 129 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that "an appellate
court does not consider issues not ruled upon below..." and therefore "it is appropriate
to remand the case to the district court to first address this issue." 130
Remanding constitutional issues to a trial court can be problematic, however. In
State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court held that a post-trial ruling regarding a constitutional question is an inappropriate remedy and a retrial is required:
To ask the trial court to address the [motion] now would be to tempt it to reach a
post hoc rationalization for the [resulting effect]... Such a mode of proceeding
holds too much potential for abuse. The only fair way to proceed is to vacate defendant's conviction and remand the matter for retrial. 131
The trial court in this case fulfilled the Ramirez Court's fears. In issuing its Memorandum Decision and Order on Mr. Maese's Motion for Arrest of Judgment, 132 the trial

128

Utah R. Crim. P. 12(e) (2008) (emphasis added).

129

Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).

130

United States v. Walters, 269 F.3d 1207,1219 (10th Cir. 2001).

131

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991).

132

Attached at ADDENDUM C.
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court misstated the facts and the law. For example, in reciting the Probable Cause
Statement charging Mr. Maese, the trial court wrote:
(b) an escort with the initials A.F. was encouraged by Mr. Maese during October
and December 2005 to engage in oral sex without a condom and that if she didn't
engage in sex acts she would not get work; 133
Yet the Probable Cause Statement, quoted in whole and verbatim, shows:
b. A.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between October and December of
2005, states that MEESE [sic] threatened her if she did not continue working for
Doll House. A.F. states CURTIS regularly encouraged good reviews on TER, and
specifically encouraged bbbj, which is a term for oral sex without a condom. A.F.
states that CURTIS made clear that if she did not tip the phone girl, which was
usually her self [sic] (the person that sets appointments), she would not get any
more appointments. 134
The alleged illegal conduct is clearly attributed to Mr. Maese's former codefendant,
Tiffany Curtis.
Additionally, the trial court's order misstates the law. For example, the court cites
State v. Bernards135 for the proposition that "specific dates are not necessary when a
count is part of an ongoing criminal enterprise/' 136 Yet in State v. Bernards this Court
noted that, after receiving a motion for bill of particulars, the trial court compelled the
State to narrow the timeframe for each count alleged. The State complied, narrowing
down to a month for one count, and to single dates for two counts. More importantly,
this Court found that that, "The probable cause statement also provided detailed facts

133

R. at 720 (Memorandum Decision and Order at 25.).

134

R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at f 5, § b.).

135

State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,166 P.3d 626.

136

R. at 723 (Memorandum Decision and Order at 28.).
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associated with each charged offense."137 Furthermore, in Bernards, references to an
"ongoing criminal enterprise" are nonexistent.
Thus here, as predicted by the Utah Supreme Court, the trial court succumbed to its
temptation to reach a post hoc rationalization for its failure to rule on Mr. Maese's Motion for Bill of Particulars; compromising Mr. Maese's right to adequate notice.
i. The trial court's waiver claim misinterprets Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f).
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court asserted that Mr. Maese waived
his right to a ruling on his motion for a bill of particulars. Here the record shows that
the trial court asked both litigants if they were ready to proceed with trial. Both parties
answered affirmatively. Yet Mr. Maese did not, and could not, have knowingly and intelligently waived his right to adequate notice through a general question.
Importantly, knowing and intelligent is the standard for waiver of counsel, 138 Miranda rights, 139 entering a guilty plea, 140 even waiving a probation revocation hearing. 141 Furthermore, the trial court's analysis, predicated on Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 12(f), is flawed. Rule 12(f) states in relevant part:
Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof.. , 142

137

State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,117,166 P.3d 626.

138 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
139

State v. Barrett, 2006 UT App 417, \ 11,147 P.3d 491.

140

State v. Bedstead, 2006 UT 42, \ 16,140 P.3d 1288.

141

State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, f 13, 977 P.2d 1224.

142

Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f) (2008).
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In this case, the State and the trial court received Mr. Maese's motion for a bill of
particulars143 and heard oral arguments;144 all parties knew the matter was ripe for decision. These facts are uncontested; consequently, Mr. Maese made a timely request
prior to trial and Rule 12(f)'s mandates are satisfied.
Yet under the trial court's theory, these documented realities are irrelevant; a trial
court can inoculate itself against any Rule 12(e) claims, pursuant to Rule 12(f), by asking
a general and customary "readiness" question. Therefore the trial court's rule interpretation requires Mr. Maese to nag the trial court into ruling on his motion. But Mr. Maese
has no affirmative obligation to, and moreover cannot, compel the trial court to rule.
The trial court maintains its obligation to enter a decision before the start of trial. To
hold otherwise renders, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) meaningless.
The record shows that the trial court had the first opportunity to address the adequate notice claim but abdicated its responsibility. The trial court's theory— that Mr.
Maese's counsel would identify an adequate notice issue, move for a bill of particulars,
orally argue the merits, then waive his right to adequate notice in the eleventh hour—
creates an ineffective assistance of counsel issue which overcomes the waiver claim.
*

*

*

In his State v. Wilcox dissent, Justice Stewart noted that "the more amorphous the prosecution's case, the less notice the defendant receives and the less chance the defendant
will have of defending... If the defendant goes to trial on [vague information], the result

143

R. at 167.

144

R. at 197.
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is virtually foreordained/' 145 Here, inadequate notice created an inherently unfair
framework, not just a flaw in trial presentation; structural error.
As the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Cruz, "Structural errors are flaws in the
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself."146 Inadequate notice deprived Mr. Maese —and they jury —of a roadmap
to follow the case. By failing to correlate each count with specific witnesses or victims,
the State made the scope of its case practically limitless. And considering the incalculable number of interactions Mr. Maese had with scores of escorts over the course of nearly two years, the State's failure rendered its case immune from variance.
A bill of particulars' — and adequate notice's —purpose is to bind the State to specific
facts. In State v. Myers, the Utah Supreme Court wrote, "The bill of particulars thus limits the field of inquiry under the charge laid in the information." 147 Yet not bound to any
unified theories of law or fact, here, the State presented the jury with a moving target.
At trial, the State argued it proved Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution at least 155
times and emphasized, "We've shown actually more than the necessary charges in
terms of the separate instances of exploitation of a prostitute." 148 Mr. Maese was prejudiced when, by anticipating to defend against four counts of Exploiting Prostitution, he
unexpectedly had to answer more than 150 accusations. Mr. Maese's defense, predicated on the State's Amended Information, was only l / 4 0 t h of what was necessary. This

145

State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1035-36 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J. dissenting).

146

State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,117,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citations omitted).

147

State v. Myers, 302 P.2d 276, 279 (Utah 1956).

148

R. at 320 (Tr. 376:23-25, 380:21-23, July 11, 2008.).
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si TI i; :t i iral erroi affected 1\ Ir ]\ laese's ei itire ti Ial ai id led to a \ ei y foreseeable 01 rt coi r t E":
An unconstrained prosecution and a jury that lacked unanimity.
POINT II. Mr. Maese's right to jury unanimity was violated because: (1) the trial
court failed to compel the State to elect offenses; (2) its initial jury un
animity instruction obviously miscommunicated Utah law; then (3) it
compounded this error with its supplemental instruction; and (4) it
erred by barring juror statements showing that Mr. Maese's jury failed
to reach a unanimous verdict.
Jury unanimity is a fundamental principle and right of justice in American criminal law;
"a right so fundamental that it may not be wai\ eu
ted15' n
the cnim1.'

•
j !

-, • •*• i v. • *

• '

"d -1 • V* ( nch clement ui

I! - iM >t * -n*>ugh that [the jury] simply u n a n i m o u s l y agree o n guilt." 1 5 2
i

T;'.'•!'» :'

.; * L tali, constitutionally manda-

State prosecutes ai i ii Ldr • icii ial i n ider a stati ite tl lat defii les

separate crimes: o\ O» ^ here the State presents evidence of a greater n u m b e r of separate criminal offenses than a defendant r- K .uirgcd w iti \w
A

'

*

'

'

*'

.

unanimity is jeopardized.
^ )reme Coi irt 1 leld tl i,at

one of t w o mechanisms, election of offenses or a specific jury unanimity instruction,
preserv es j in > i ii i,ai ilii Lit y :
.. .we hold that when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a
single com it... —any one of whicl t could support a conviction thereunder — and
the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless one or both
of the following occurs; (1) at or before the * lose of its case-in-chief, the prosecu149

United States v. league, 443 F.3d 1310,1317 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).

150

Utah Coi istitution, Article I sectioi 110
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State v. Saum :k 7 s, 1 999 [ J 1 59 % 60 992 I ; 2d 951 (en if »1 lasis i u ided).
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Id. at 1 64.
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tion is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the
"conduct" element of the charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the jury a
specific unanimity instruction, i.e., an instruction that advises the jury that all
twelve of its members must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 153
In this case, the State created both factors jeopardizing jury unanimity. First, as argued above, Exploiting Prostitution can be committed through five actus reus alternatives. Similarly, Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Statute can be violated through at
least three distinct actus reus alternatives: (1) & (2) by acquiring, maintaining an interest
in, or operate an enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity or a pattern's
proceeds; (3) by participating in an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity; or (4) by conspiring to perform (1), (2), or (3). Second, the State argued that Mr.
Maese violated the Exploiting Prostitution statute no fewer than 150 times. 154 Despite
these red flags, the trial court failed to protect Mr. Maese's jury unanimity right.
A. The trial court failed to compel the State to elect offenses.
When the State introduces evidence of more than one possible act constituting a
charged criminal offense, the doctrine of election is implicated. Election of offenses requires the State, compelled by the trial court, to submit to the jury specific acts reconciled with specific counts for deliberation and verdict purposes. As articulated by the
Tennessee Supreme Court, election of offenses serves numerous interests:
it enables the defendant to prepare for the specific charge; it protects a defendant
against double jeopardy; it enables the trial judge to review the weight of the
evidence in its role as thirteenth juror; and it enables an appellate court to review
the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The most important interest served by elec153

State v. Arceo, 928 P.2d 843, 874-75 (Haw. 1996).

154

R. at 320 (Tr. 376:25, July 11, 2008.).
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tlon^

h o w e v e r / i s to ensure that the ji irors deliberate over and render a veruict
based on the same offense.155
And while Utah's appellate courts last explicitly addressed the election doctrine

Hilberg, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the State's failure to elect offenses:
The trial court permitted the prosecution u introduce six distinct acts or crimes
to be shown in evidence before the jury. . w ithout requiring any election to be
made, and allowed the case to go to the jury upoi \ a; - i he several acts... Whether
the jury united in a verdict upon each act, or SOTTM >-• *ne and others on another
of the acts provod <; -> problematical.
No jury should be set to fishing or hunting for a charge which the\ are called
upon to :s \ Such .-• course deprived the defendant of a fair trial and compelled
him, without warning, to defend against acts of which he had no notice. Manifestly, he could not be prepared to meet such confusing charges not contained in
the information. 156
h
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•. s~-f i • - r. . ! •K ; \ 1 - Maese violated the Exploiting I 'rostit i ltioi 1 sta

tute no fewer than 150 times 157 yet charged him u ,th onlv tour counts. The State used a
sin lilar argumei it regardii \j
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three of these specific instances of unlawful conduct o> more — and we charged four —
you then qualii \ * »v the pattern of unlawful activity..." 158 Also it argued that "pattern
of uiuav v -.

^-neaeir • *i, • 1:

•.

t

•

*E-

-\ * *

least three episodes'' 159 with the additional element of an enterprise. Yet like Exploiting
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Prostitution, a Pattern of Unlawful Activity conviction can be sustained through any of
three distinct actus reus elements.
The State's case presentation satisfies the Hilberg criteria. And yet the trial court
failed to require the State to elect which offenses it would submit to the jury. Necessarily, the jury went fishing for the four discrete acts —and predicate episodes — they were
called upon to try. This error invited a patchwork verdict 160 and stole Mr. Maese's unwaivable constitutional right to jury unanimity.
B. The trial court's initial jury unanimity instruction miscommunicated
jury unanimity principle.

Utah's

In State v. Cruz, the Utah Supreme Court validated reasonable doubt instructions by
stating, "we need only ask whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly communicate the principle of reasonable doubt.. ," 161 This same simple question can be
asked of jury unanimity instructions.
Yet necessarily, jury unanimity instructions require more precision than reasonable
doubt instructions. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Reyes, the English language permits "many formulations for proof beyond a reasonable doubt that correctly
convey its meaning/ 7162 But jury unanimity's specific definition —"unanimity as to a
specific crime and as to each element of the crime" 163 — cannot be accurately conveyed in
myriad ways. Especially in this case.

160 Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether
Verdicts are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 473 (1983).
161

State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 21,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citations omitted).

162

State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 20,116 P.3d 305.

163

State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 60, 992 P.2d 951 (emphasis added).
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A,s previously established the State cl larged Mr IV laese i u ider sii igi liar stati ites tl lat
defined multiple crimes and presented evidence of a greater number of separate crimii Lai offei ises tl lai 1.1: le was charged v » Itl i Despite tl: tis, tl te trial cc i irt Issued oi i l> a tw o
sentence jury instruction regarding unanimity. Jury Instruction Ne 25 reads:
25. REACHING A VERDICT This being a criminal case, your verdict must be
unanimous; all jurors must agree. When you air all in agreement, then you have
reached a verdict and \ our work is finished.l!l4
While this Instruction generally advises the jury, it incorrectly states Utah law. liistruction 25 requires the jury to agree on guilt —the obvious binary choice in

\ ordu t

jury that its only purpose is to determine a vertiict Win MI the jury agrees on a venl^ t,
their work is fii lished; yet tl te Uta I: i Supreme v om L M.IS held that it i- 'not enough
that [the ji lry] simply unanimously agree oi igu.l!

-

•..:;.•*•..-.•

that Mr. Maese cannot be convicted except upon ]wr\ unanimity of even tactual ele11 tei it i Lecessary tc coi Lstiti it E:1 Exp loitii i,g I ^rostit :

•

u . : • . :y

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee illuminates the inherent dangers in
providing a jury with a cursory unanimity instruction:
_ L o n v i c t i o n that is not unanimous as to :.w oeienoant s specific illegal action
is no more justifiable than a conviction by a jury that is not unanimous on a specific a)unt. Where the State presents evidence of numerous offenses, the trial
court must augment the general jury unani n u t\ instruction to insure that the jury
understands its duty to agree unanimous!} to a particular set of facts. A skeletal

164

R. at 284 (Jury I n s t r u c t s !

165

State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, t 64, 992 P.2d 951.
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jury instruction of unanimity ferments a strong possibility of a composite jury
verdict in violation of an appellant's constitutional rights.166
Here the State's case, predicated on numerous and diverse criminal theories, prevented
Jury Instruction NQ 25 from accurately communicating Utah's jury unanimity law.
1. This Court should address this jury instruction under plain error.
Plain error occurs when "(i) an error was made; (ii) the error should have been obvious
to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a
more favorable outcome was reasonably likely/'167 The doctrine exists because, "Neither a counsel's nor a judge's error should be the cause of one's"168 conviction.
Here, Mr. Maese failed to request a specific jury unanimity instruction. The Plain Error doctrine governs, however, because jury unanimity is "a right so fundamental that it
may not be waived."169 Moreover, this case satisfies the plain error test.
As argued above, an error was made; the jury instructions —particularly in this case
where the trial court failed to compel the State to elect offenses — inaccurately communicate the law regarding jury unanimity. This error should have been obvious to the trial court because the case law regarding jury unanimity is well settled; State v. Saunders
was decided nearly a decade ago, State v. Russell more than 20 years ago, United State v.
Gipson more than 30. Gross deviation from, or blindness to, stare decisis is obvious error.
The last prong, a reasonably likely more favorable outcome, is established in several
ways. Had a split jury— which apparently existed here as inferred by their written ques166

State v. Neal, 2002 TN Crim App 76, 5-6 (unpublished) (Attached at ADDENDUM E).

167

State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 9, 9 P.3d 164.
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* State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,164 (Utah 1989).

169

United States v. league, 443 F.3d 1310,1317 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
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tioii aloi le

beei t forced to recoi idle its differei ices it i i lay 1 ia\ e been i 11 table tc •; resi i lilt-

ing in a hung jury or acquittal. Alternatively, as articulated in his concurring opinion in
State v. Tillman, justice Stewart v\ roh< that
nonunanimity tends to subvert the proper operation of the lesser included offense doctrine... because the jury may never have to consider that doctrine since
it is not compelled to decide whether the defendant committed one or the other
r ^oth5 alternative element^ in \]M definition < • h r r r m e ]70
H e r e r.u- \vi ^ w a s p r e s e n t e d w Al\ A i d i n g 1'rostitution
less*"

'

. J- i

J-> Exploiting P r o s t i t u t i o n ' s

•':•»•.„•

Under any alternative outcome theory — acquittal, hung jury, or conviction of lesser
inch ided offenses

1"\ Ir I"\ laese s 01 itcc i ne / • ould certaii il> 1 i,a\ e beei 1.11 lore fa\ orable

This case is analogous to United States v. Gipson, the original federal jury unanimity case.
Ii i ti tat case "tl le fi: n ors ret i n i led to tl le ecu n tro from the court, handing the judge a note that reac
all coui its or i \ ill it be brokei i. dc v • l it

I "1 L ei: e
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iditioi lal ii istri ictions

> ur ,t ' n o . will he be guilty of
' I "1 le jt ldge ace i n atel) percei \ ed tl: lat 1:1 lis

question could be interpreted in several different ways." 172 Here, the trial court did not.
In this case the trial court received a question from the jury which asked:
In instruction f* " ..-. • . .. . \ ail of them have to be fulfilled in order to i:i;a ;. i
defendant guilty o i •..--! \ -ne-i *! the conditions met? Also the same question tor instruction #40. 173

170

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 ( U t a h 1987) (Stewart, ]., c o n c u r r i n g ) .

r

United States v. Gvpson, ^ ^ I .Id 4:v>, 4r>- (^th i. i,, i*/ . ,.

173

R. a t 312, (Jury Q u e s t i o n No 1, a t t a c h e d a t ADDENDUM F).
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The trial court instructed the jury with:
Answer: Both Instructions 37 and 40's subparagraph (the a, b, c's) you refer to
end with the word "or" and therefore should be read accordingly. 174
The Supplemental Instruction inaccurately conveyed Utah law. The Supplemental
Instruction encouraged individual jurors to find Mr. Maese guilty of subsection (a) "or"
(b) of both Pattern of Unlawful Activity (Instruction 37) 175 and Exploiting Prostitution
(Instruction 40).176 Because jury unanimity has a strict definition, the trial court should
have instructed the jury that it must be unanimous as to: (1) which actus reus alternative
Mr. Maese violated; as well as (2) what specific acts it relied upon in finding guilt.
D. Mr. Maese's jury failed to be unanimous, but in misinterpreting Utah R. Evid
606(b) the trial court barred juror statements.
A guilty verdict that is not unanimous is not a true verdict. In State v. Saunders, the Utah
Supreme Court held that when a jury agrees a defendant is guilty of crime, but the jury
disagrees upon the specific crime or each element thereof, its unanimous guilty verdict
fails to meet the Utah Constitution's requirements.
For example, if a jury were given no elements instructions, a unanimous guilty
verdict would not meet the requirements of Article I, section 10. Nor would a
guilty verdict be valid if some jurors found a defendant guilty of robbery while
others found him guilty of theft, even though all jurors agree that he was guilty of
some crime. Nor would a verdict be valid if some jurors found a defendant guilty
of a robbery committed on December 25,1990, in Salt Lake City, but other jurors
found him guilty of a robbery committed January 15,1991, in Denver, Colorado,

174

R. at 312 (Supplemental Jury Instruction, Answer to Jury Question NQ 1, attached at
ADDENDUM F).

175

R. at 294, (Instruction NQ 37 detailed Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603.).

176

R. at 297 (Instruction NQ 40 detailed Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305.).
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even though all jurors found him guilty of the element , i L;u , ; ;me of roh "* rv
and all the jurors together agreed that he was guilty nf ^ »nn» n *hbery.177
If a jury agrees that some crime was committed, but disagrees upon which crime or
w 1 ii :1 in, acts v v ere ci in 1.I1 lal tl leir \ erdict is ii Lvalid " I "1 leir \ erdict earn lot be a tri re \ erdi ::t;
invalid, it is no verdict at all.
1, Mr, Maese presents juror statements solely to establish that his jury failed to
reach a true and valid verdict; the statements are therefore admissible.
Utah -\u ;e of Evidence 606(b) states in relevant part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement oca irring during the course of the jury's deliberations w fo the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions a> influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or in
dictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith 178
In State v. Gee, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Utah R. Evid. 606(b). It wrote
that testimony that the jury " [misunderstood] fact or law, or that they misunderstood
the cl large of tl ue • :: :)i 11 t cur tl i,e effect of tl leii verdi ::t or ::: pii doi is surmises ai id processes
of reasoning in arriving at a verdict" 179 is precluded.
\ et in this case, ]\ Ir. Maese sought to introuun.

;^:.!IHI,,\

:;:..: .;.• ...:'\ t a i k j i- . 1 ^ . ,

a unanimous verdict. Accordingly, long-held law permits inquiry into verdicts that are
untrue, even verdicts that at first glance are seemingly valid. The Tenth Circuit Court of
;
Appea Is held that I ''eel R 1:>
i :l 606(b) pei 1 1 lits Ii iqi liries regarding vei c He i acci iracy:

Rule 606(b) forbids a juror from testifying as to matters occurring during deliberations or the juror's mental processes. I low ever we agree with the Second Cir-

177

State v. Saunders, 1999 UT * } f60 992 P 2d 951 (1 ; n 1.];: >1 1, isrs , u 1< k ?d).
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State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972).
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cuit that Rule 606(b), by its own terms, is silent as to queries designed to confirm
the accuracy of the verdict, and that the rule therefore does not preclude a juror
from testifying as to the potential miscommunication of the verdict.180
Therefore a direct inquiry into the verdict, and its validity, alone is permissible. In
Fox v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed similar situations:
By considering these affidavits, we do not impinge upon the rule that the affidavit of a juror may not be used to impeach a verdict which has been announced in
open court. It has long been well settled that the affidavit of a juror is admissible
to show the true verdict or that no verdict was reached at all.181
The court lists four cases to support its position.
Similarly under Utah law, Justice Stewart wrote that Utah R. Evid. 606(b) is not absolute and "certainly verdicts are not absolutely inviolate. Verdicts based on chance or
bribery, for example, have long been subject to challenge, since they do not even
purport to be based on the law and the evidence."182 If juror statements show an invalid
verdict, they are permissible evidence.
2. Mr. Maese's juror statements prove that his jury failed to reach a unanimous
verdict.
Mr. Maese submitted juror interviews to the trial court which convincingly demonstrate
his verdict was not unanimous and therefore no verdict was reached.
On July 19, 2008, just days following the verdict in this case, Juror Dan Christensen,
Juror Number 4, was interviewed. In that interview, he stated that the jury deliberated

180

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534,1548 (10th Cir. 1993).

181

Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1969).

182

State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 85 (Utah 1988) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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for qi lite soi i t.e 1 in i Le a b c i i/l tl le speci fie acts tl ia1 • ma) have constituted the Exploiting
Prostitution counts. Mr. Christensen said:
And then there was also some confusion as to whether we had to agree on the
same letter or if we could agree on different letters but still find each of them
And then as far as A, I),and 1\ - it was kind of ; ike ^pl it across the room... like
some people agree on A o*.n .* IMVP. i sure, some people agreed on D but weren't
.sure, and some people agreed (MI I :HH W etvn't like, so there were some people
who said yes on A.. R r . smd 1 . and then there w ere some members of the jury
who said I well no I only feel B, C, I) and E. Some people felt like A was true and
some people felt like D was tnu i Inn not necessarily both. 183
Mi ( Iirisliiiiiseiii alsuNinl lli.it ho

'*.- • - fluf Mr. Maese shared in prostitution

proceeds, but that other jurors did. I herefore some jurors believed Mr. Maese was
guilu oi Lxpuniiri^ . i • *.ii, . * : ^ . i . :. • •; *» < - • •

t.

On August 9, 2008, another juror, Tricia Odeneal, Juror Number 8, was interviewed.
She said that the jury failed to agree upon which specific acts Mr. Maese performed that
A j o l a i n I Mn I •» | ili nihil"' i'l'o'siittjtipp '.lalnli

Q:

So he necessarily exploited prostitution at least four times?
. :>. .\i x- definiteh \i hi ,-UK. .on L;IO ;h... .;e was senciing OWL
basis, ot course.

183

Q:

Sure. Sure. But so } on Jidi •'! necessary —

A:

- ii Laudible

.I ;any

K at 352 (Motion lor An t•-! of Judgment at 30. Interview with Juror Dan Christiansen, conducted on July ! LK 2008 by Kelly Ann Booth.).
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Q:

You didn't necessarily agree on each of the counts that this was the behavior that constituted this count, this was the behavior that constituted this
count; you kind of took a more general and organic approach to it?

A:

Yeah.

Q:

Okay. 184

Still another juror, Shawn Meik, Juror Number 7, stated in his interview on August
5, 2008 that the trial court instructed the jury to convict Mr. Maese of all four Exploiting
Prostitution counts even if they believed he was guilty of only one count.

184

Q:

[Mr. Maese] knows he was convicted, but he doesn't know what conduct
he was convicted of, and I was hoping you might talk to me a little bit
about that.

A:

Well, can you be a little more specific?

Q:

Well, there were — there were four guilty verdicts on exploitation of prostitution, and so I was hoping you could just say, like, on, you know, on the
first count of that, we found that he was guilty because of this; on the
second one, because of this; third, this; fourth this.

A:

I don't know a lot of details. The paperwork we were sent in the room with
said that if he was found guilty of one, he was found guilty— he was found
guilty of all four.

Q:

You say the paperwork you were sent in the room with said if what?

A:

That if he was found guilty on one of those counts, he was automatically
guilty on all four.

Q:

Okay. I'm talking about specifically the exploitation of prostitution.

A:

Right. And that's what I'm talking about. There were four counts of that.

Q:

Gotcha. 185

R. at 352-53 (Motion for Arrest of Judgment at 30-31. Interview with Juror Tricia
Odeneal, conducted on August 9, 2008 by Shane Johnson.).
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i'hi mry failed to reach a

unanimous verdict. While the reasoning behind nonunanimity — namely poor jury Instructions—may be inadmi —.1 .*
to render a true verdict, or that no verdict was reached at all, is admissible. These
statements prove that Mr. Maese was convicted by a non-unanimous jury ve*
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factual bases and legal theories to find Mr. Maese guilty of Exploiting Prostitution and a
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tween the evidence the State produced and the counts the jury convicted him on. Lour.;
II could be a conviction for violating Exploiting Prostitution's subsection (n) rh\. nn.t v
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v. i.;i« others found that (c) or id) w a^ \ ml ted. Likewise, each Exploiting Prostitution
com n t T, i m. v. v ascribed to testin 1.01 i\ fron L ai t) 01 te w iti less 01 fron i. all of tl ten i
Circumstances like these are why Utah s jury unanimity principle exists. In his State
v. Tillman concurring opinion, Justice Stewart recognized that jury unanimity is synon\
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html Injil I !<• \\ arnrd

if the principle of jury unanimity is relaxed, all the vaunted protections of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt will be threatened. Requiring juror unanimity as to
the crime itself only, rather than each element of the crime, would permit a jury
to render inconsistent and potentially irrational verdicts because they may be

185

R. 353-54 (Motion for Arrest of Judgment at 31-32. Interview with Juror Shawn Yleik,
conducted on August 5, 2008 by Shane Johnson.).
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based on conflicting and even inconsistent determinations of the facts. That is no
small erosion of a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system.186
Mr. Maese faced this very scenario; the State failed to elect offenses for specific
charges and a jury convicted him based on conflicting and/or inconsistent factual determinations. Contributing to this was an erroneous jury unanimity instruction which
failed to correctly communicate the law; this error is obvious. Moreover, we know that
Mr. Maese's jury was not unanimous because they have told us. The factual basis for
the verdict is unexplained; which counts were ascribed to which acts, or that counts and
acts were ascribed to particular subsections or even theories is unknown.
POINT III. The evidence at trial failed to support at least three Exploiting Prostitution episodes; consequently, the State provided insufficient evidence of
a Pattern of Unlawful Activity.
After reviewing "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the verdict,"187 the record shows that the State presented insufficient
evidence to sustain Mr. Maese's convictions.
A. When comparing the specifics of the crimes charged in Mr. Maese's Information to the evidence the State adduced at trial, fatal variance exists.
The notice the State provides a defendant binds it to the specific facts it alleges.188 This
doctrine, variance, is based in constitutional due process.189 In State v. Burnett, the Utah
Supreme Court held that material "variance between the specifics of the crime charged

186

State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, J., concurring).

187

State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 44, 57 P.3d 977.

188

See Generally, State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 1985); McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d
321 (Utah 1983); State v. Myers, 302 P.2d 276, (Utah 1956).

189

State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,1215 n. 10 (Utah 1987).
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ii it. 1 i le inforn latioi t. ai ltd 1 I t.e ci in ie of w h i c h the court permit[s] t h e jury to convict" 1 9 0 requires reversal In State v. Marcum, the Utah Supreme Court wrote, "A variance is material i f it actually prejudices t! ie accused \ • itl 11 esp ?ct t :» a si lbstantial i igl in. I: :)T I \ 1 tere
the information is so defective that it results in a iiiiscarriage of justice/' 1 9 1 F u r t h e r m o r e ,
in State v. Fulton t h e U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t wrote:
It w o u l d be a mockery of the constitutional rights of defendant to allow the state
to falsely state t h e particulars of t h e offense c h a r g e d a n d t h e n . . . obtain a conviction founded o n said evidence. 1 9 2
H e r e the n v . -s\i s h o w s a material —and constitutionally fatal —variance between the
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The State omitted these allegations from the Information and Probable Cause Statement. When Mr. Maese failed to receive a bill of particulars, his defense became predicated on the theory that the factual allegations against him failed to constitute criminal
acts. That theory is true and correct. These instances, and all other evidence — outside
testimony relating to D.T. and N.F. — fail to establish the crimes articulated in the State's
Information. Moreover, the State failed to introduce evidence of the essential elements
and attendant circumstances required to sustain criminal convictions.
B. The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain convictions on four Exploiting Prostitution
alternatives.
In presenting its case, the State " carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt each element of an offense.. ." 197 And while circumstantial evidence alone can be
sufficient to satisfy this burden, a jury conviction grounded exclusively in circumstantial evidence must be examined to decide:
(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove
each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is
not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or
speculative possibilities of guilt. 198
Here, the State failed to present elements required to satisfy three alternatives of Exploiting Prostitution. Of the remaining alternatives, multiple convictions cannot be entered; one as a matter of law, the other because of testimony at trial. Therefore, the four
Exploiting Prostitution convictions are erroneous.

197

State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, | 45,192 P.3d 867 (quotations and citations omitted).

198

State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997).
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A I.1 \ IHVM' tint uo\ i*ith tin inmate* for ti invite of prostitution.

1

As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution. statute pu*; wo\> : .-• i v.iw: • u
r\M t :

; ni-

ij r t : .;rai h a - reads as follows:
(a) procures a n inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a h o u s e of prostitution for one w ho w o u l d be an inmate; 1 9 9

Pi ii tl le1 1 * u i1 - i

1r

tal it. Code defii les "1 1.01 lse of prostiti ition" ai id " i n m a t e " as:

" H o u s e of prostitution" m e a n s a place w h e r e prostitution * u promotion »>f
prostitution is regularly carried on b\ om- M more persons u n d e r the con1.n i management, or supervision of another.
(..

' i n m a t e " m e a n s a p e r s o n w h o engage - * •
agency of a h o u s e of prostitution.

1. * .in-:

11 or thr 01 1 gh the

200

These legal definitions w e r e recited to the jury via Jury Instructions NQ 38 and N° 40.
But cei itral to I I01 is*

i

"i

*

: * 1 • :e referred tc is

physical premises (versus ju 1 \ business ). 1 his definition is consistent with the o p i nion usage * *i \ 1 - .. -.< i •; :.'i * :.;.,:.* ..:•«.. t .a 11 v ase law as w ell I "he 1 \ n lericai 11 lei itage
D i c t i o n a r y defines " h o u s e of prostitution" as:
n At1 establishment ii1 v\ hich the services of prostitutes are available on the
premises. 2 0 1
1 \.ddif ioi tally , I Jtah's case law describes houses of prostitution occurring in a hotel ii \
Ogden, 2 0 2 a trailer h o u s e on U. S. H i g h w a y 91, 2 0 3 a n d a dance hall in Ely, Nevada. 2 0 4
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U t a h C o d e Ann $ 7h-10-1 W ( 1 ) (2006).
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ic American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language,

Fourth Edition. H o u g h t o n Mifflin C o m p a n v r 2004. 03 Jan. 2009. <Dictionary.com
http://dictionary.reference.com/hn»w >(\'hoi ; ^ «.* rr.202

State v. Tacconi 171 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1946).
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All definitions reference physical locations —premises —where prostitution or promotion of prostitution occur with customers traveling to the respective locations. Furthermore, the legislature distinguished "a house of prostitution" from "a prostitution
business"205 in Code. Statutory construction rules require that the two definitions differ.
This definition, house of prostitution as a place, is further supported by the common
usage of the word inmate. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "inmate" as:
n. A resident of a dwelling that houses a number of occupants, especially a person confined to an institution, such as a prison or hospital.206
To define "inmate" merely as a prostitute is repugnant to both its plain and legal definitions. An inmate is defined by a house of prostitution. The house of prostitution is
defined by a place. An inmate without a premises or house is a merely prostitute.
The Doll House Escorts was a business which sent escorts to multiple locations
throughout Utah.207 The Doll House was not a "house of prostitution" as defined by
statute, jury instruction, or common usage. Accordingly, Mr. Maese could not be convicted for recruiting prostitutes for a nonexistent house of prostitution.
Moreover, trial testimony failed to establish that Mr. Maese recruited prostitutes at
all. To the contrary, Tiffany Curtis testified that neither she nor Mr. Maese required es-

203

State v. Woodall, 305 P.2d 473,474 (Utah 1956).

204

Crellin v. Thomas, 247 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1952).

205

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(e).

206

"inmate." The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition.
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. 08 Jan. 2009. <Dictionary.com
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/inmate>.

207

Trial testimony references the word "send" and "sent" on appointments 37 times.
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corts to perform sex acts.208 They refrained from discussing sex acts because they didn't
want escorts "to think that these guys were going to be aggressive with them."209
The remaining witnesses7 testimony proves Mr. Maese failed to procure Inmates for
a House of Prostitution.
Allyson Jensen testified that Mr. Maese was present for her interview210 but Allyson
offered no additional testimony about her interview.
Jennifer Harris testified that Tiffany Curtis interviewed her, and Mr. Maese was not
present at any time.211 On cross-examination, Jennifer was asked directly "did Mr.
Maese ever tell you that as part of your condition of employment you would have to
have sex?" to which she replied, "No."212
Heather Twede testified that Mr. Maese was present for her interview213 but that
"Nothing was really required except that we had to wear a dress and heels I think and it
consisted of, you know, maybe dancing."214
Danielle Thomas testified that Mr. Maese was present for the latter portion of her interview with The Doll House.215 Yet when asked if sexual activity was required of her,
Danielle said "No escort service in their right mind is really going to tell you up front
208

R. at 319 (Tr. 114:7-11, July 10, 2008.).

209

R. at 319 (Tr. 73:24-25, July 10, 2008.).

210

R. at 319 (Tr. 121:10-17, July 10, 2008.).

211

R. at 320 (Tr. 146:6-8, July 11, 2008.).

212

R. at 320 (Tr. 159:22-25, July 11, 2008.).

213

R. at 320 (Tr. 164:10-16, July 11, 2008.).

214

R. at 320 (Tr. 166:2-4, July 11, 2008.).

215

R. at 320 (Tr. 177:10-19, July 11, 2008.).
~
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you need to have sex. I had already been doing it for five years so I kind of already
knew what was going on."216
Heather May Wright testified that Mr. Maese was present at her interview,217 but
neither the State nor Mr. Maese asked additional questions regarding the interview.
Nicole Fernandez testified that Tiffany Curtis contacted her about working for The
Doll House218 but did not indicate that she was formally interviewed. Her testimony
indicated that Mr. Maese "just wanted to make sure that I had the looks to do the [bachelor] party... [and] He just asked if I wanted to do it and if Fd done parties before and
I told him yes."219
Plus, Exploiting Prostitution's subsection (a), through the word "procures," requires
an intentional mens rea. Regardless of whether these witnesses eventually prostituted
themselves, the State failed to prove that Mr. Maese intentionally obtained Inmates for a
House of Prostitution. Mr. Maese freely admitted to placing ads in various media and
participating in interviews for legal and licensed escorts.220 This greatly differs from
purposely recruiting prostitutes, much less Inmates, for a House of Prostitution.
Because the State failed to introduce evidence that The Doll House was a House of
Prostitution, or that Mr. Maese recruited Inmates, as a matter of law under Exploiting
Prostitution's subparagraph (a), Mr. Maese could not be convicted.

216

R. at 320 (Tr. 181:11-14, July 11, 2008.).

217

R. at 320 (Tr. 209:22-25, July 11, 2008.).

218

R. at 320 (Tr. 231:8-10, July 11, 2008.).

219

R. at 320 (Tr. 232:13-17, July 11, 2008.).

220

R. at 320 (Tr. 307:13-20; Tr. 269:19-271:17, July 11, 2008).
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2. As a matter of law, Mr. Maese did not encourage, induce, or otherwise purposely
cause anyone to become or remain a prostitute.
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete criminal acts; subsection (b) reads as follows:
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or remain a prostitute;221
Utah law has long held that encouraging someone to become or remaining a prostitute refers to a change in status; not encouraging individual prostitution acts. Specifically in State v. Gates, the Utah Supreme Court explored the meaning of nearly identical
language —the pandering statute at the time —and concluded that, "the meaning of that
term is that the other person attempt or try to persuade her to change her course of
life."222 This construction, with prostitute as status, dates to at least 1912.223 To "become
a prostitute" is also referenced in dicta, as status, as recently as 2006 and throughout
multiple cases.224 This interpretation is also consistent with Aiding Prostitution's contrast; a person is guilty of Aiding Prostitution if he "procures or attempts to procure a
prostitute for a patron."225
No testimony exists that Mr. Maese encouraged anyone to change their status from
nonprostitute to prostitute. Additionally, no testimony was introduced where Mr.
Maese was confronted by an employee contemplating reversion to nonprostitute from

221

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1).

222

State v. Gates, 221 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1950).

223

State v. Topham, 123 P. 888 (Utah 1912).

224

In re O.D., 2006 UT App 382, f 3,145 P.3d 1180; State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347 (Utah 1951).

225

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304(b).
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prostitute; Mr. Maese could not have encouraged someone to continue in their prostitute status. Mr. Maese's statements and actions fail to meet the statute's requirements.
3. The State failed to introduce evidence that an understanding existed between Mr,
Maese and any prostitute where he was to share in proceeds of prostitution, or
that he received any proceeds from prostitution.
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete criminal acts; subsection (d) reads as follows:
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute share the proceeds of
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to
share therein;226
Utah Code states that Mr. Maese is "presumed to be innocent until each element of
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt" and, "In absence
of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted."227 Integral to this Exploiting Prostitution alternative is evidence of an understanding, an attendant circumstances and an
element of the offense.228 The State's evidence has two deficiencies here.
First, a conviction under this Exploiting Prostitution alternative would create a repugnant verdict when contrasted with the jury's Money Laundering acquittal. Under
Utah law, Money Laundering encompasses all proceeds of any kind received from any
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 enumerated crime; prostitution is listed there.
Next, the State failed to prove that an understanding between prostitutes and Mr.
Maese existed where he was to share in proceeds from prostitution; and that he actually
shared in those profits. The State proved that escorts were required to collect $145 from
226

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1).

227

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1).

228

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2)(a) (2008).
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clients; $95 going to the company and $50 to the escort.229 Additionally, all witnesses
agreed that clients generally engaged in two contracts: one which required escorts to
show up and fully disrobe followed by a second and separate contract where escorts
negotiated with clients for any additional services.230 The Doll House had specific understandings with each witness. It would share in monies from the initial contract
which required their presence only. Specifically, it disclaimed any proceeds from subsequent contracts, regardless of what services the escort contracted for and provided. 231
Therefore, the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction
against Mr. Maese under Exploiting Prostitution's subsection (d).
4. The State failed to introduce evidence that The Doll House was a House of Prostitution or a Prostitution Business.
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete criminal acts; subsection (e) reads as follows:
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business. 232
Here, Mr. Maese acknowledged that he was partner in The Doll House. 233 Yet, as established above, The Doll House was not a house of prostitution. Therefore, The Doll
House must meet the definition of a "prostitution business/' Utah Code fails to provide

229

R. at 319 (Tr. 88:17-21, July 10, 2008.).

230

R. at 319-320 (Tr. 105:22-106:1, July 10, 2008; Tr. 148:14-149:11, Tr. 166:20-167:3, Tr.
200:10-201:6, Tr. 220:21-221:12, Tr. 240:25-241:16, July 11, 2008.).

231

R. at 319-320 (Tr. 88:22-89:5, Tr. 105:13-21, Tr. 136:1-15, July 10, 2008; Tr. 149:20-150:1,
Tr. 175:1-7, Tr. 182:4-14, July 11, 2008.).

232

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1).

233

R. at 320 (Tr. 293:1-2, July 11, 2008.).

-53-

a legal definition for Prostitution Business. Therefore, defining Prostitution Business by
the fair import of the word provides some help. 234 The word "business" is defined as:
1. an occupation, profession, or trade: His business is poultry farming.
2. the purchase and sale of goods in an attempt to make a profit.
3. a person, partnership, or corporation engaged in commerce, manufacturing,
or a service; profit-seeking enterprise or concern. 235
These ordinary meanings support a criminal definition of The Doll House selling prostitution. Yet the State failed to introduce evidence that The Doll House sold prostitution.
The Doll House sold fully-nude companionship in one hour increments. Certainly
The Doll House was a Sexually Oriented Business; its services were sexual by nature.
Yet those services are State sanctioned and Mr. Maese specifically created constructs to
prevent The Doll House's services from devolving to illegal activities.
Additionally, as previously detailed, because The Doll House customers contracted
separately with individual escorts for services beyond companionship, The Doll House
never received profits from prostitution. Undisputedly, The Doll House received $95
from nearly every appointment performed. Yet that money was received regardless of
whether or not escorts engaged in prostitution activities. 236
The Doll House generated profits only from the initial contract, regardless of whether escorts successfully negotiated secondary contracts. Jennifer Harris testified that 50%

234

See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(h) (2008).

235

business. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/business (accessed: January 18, 2009).

236

R. at 319 (Tr. 88:17-21, July 10, 2008.).
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of her appointments involved illegal sexual activity;237 necessarily, 50% of her appoints
failed to involve illegal sexual activity. Therefore, as testified to explicitly by Mr. Maese
and implicitly by others, the purpose of collecting "agency fees" upfront, before escorts
entered into further negotiations with clients, was so that the company was paid despite
customers learning that they would not receive sex acts. 238
Accordingly, The Doll House was not a prostitution business and the State failed to
introduce evidence that Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution under this subsection.
C. The State's evidence at trial for the remaining Exploiting Prostitution
natives was inherently improbable.

alter-

In State v. Robbins, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand" 239 and that "the definition of inherently improbable must include circumstances where a witness's testimony is incredibly dubious
and, as such, apparently false." 240 Importantly, using this standard, the Court mentioned an Iowa case that was overturned based on "witnesses who had motive to lie." 241
1. The State s only instance of Mr. Maese transporting a person to promote prostitution relied upon Nicole Fernandez s inherently improbable testimony.
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete criminal acts; subsection (c) provides:

237

R. at 320 (Tr. 151:18-21, July 11, 2008.).

238

R. at 320 (Tr. 274:11-275:17, July 11, 2008.).

239

State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 14 (quotations and citations omitted).

240

Id. at If 18.

241

Id. at 1 20.
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(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that
person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for transportation
with that purpose; 242
Nicole Fernandez" substantive trial testimony regarded a specific appointment, her
first as a Doll House escort. Her testimony at trial regarding this material event dramatically contradicted her testimony at the preliminary hearing. Fernandez's testimony at
both events contradicted her prior statements to police, which exonerated Mr. Maese.
Although no other witness testified that Mr. Maese transported them, Fernandez testified that Mr. Maese drove her to her first appointment. At this appointment, she testified that Mr. Maese told her the client regularly tips Doll House escorts $400.m Yet at
preliminary hearing, she testified that it was the client who told her he regularly tips escorts $200.2U (Fernandez testified at trial and at preliminary hearing that this client requested sexual intercourse but would not meet Fernandez 7 $800 asking price. 245 )
Fernandez continued by testifying that she eventually came to terms with the client
and provided manual and oral sex for $400, but the client was unhappy with this and
called Mr. Maese to complain. 246 At preliminary hearing, Fernandez testified that she
had sexual intercourse with the client for $200 because she didn't want Mr. Maese to
think she was a "flake." In this version, the satisfied customer failed to complain. 247

242

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1) (2006).

243

R. at 320 (Tr. 234:17-22, July 11,2008.).

244

R. at 81 (Tr. 72:20-73:3, April 3, 2007.).

245

R. at 320 (Tr.235:8-12, July 11, 2008); R. at 81 (Tr. 72:20-73:3, April 3, 2007.).
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* R. at 320 (Tr. 235:22-236:4, July 11, 2008.).

247

R. at 81 (Tr. 73:4-13, April 3, 2007.).
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At trial, Fernandez testified that she and Mr. Maese arranged for Mr. Maese to drop
her off at this appointment and that she would call him to come pick her up when the
appointment concluded.248 At the preliminary hearing, Fernandez testified that Mr.
Maese waited for her outside throughout the appointment.249
At trial, Fernandez testified that she "had sex with all of [her Doll House clients]/7250
At the preliminary hearing, she testified that she had sex with about half of them.251 Yet
in her police interview she claimed that she never had sex with Doll House clients.252
This version is supported by the State's Probable Cause Statement which states that she
"was not given many appointments because she would not have sex with clients."253
Prior to trial, the State was well aware of Fernandez' wildly inconsistent accounts.
She was initially emphatic to investigating officers that she never prostituted herself
with Doll House clients, but prostituted herself with her personal clients exclusively.
She was asked "Did you ever have sex with any of their clients?" and she replied "Not
theirs, no... I had sex with a few of my own.. ,"254 At trial, she stated "I've seen so many
clients, I don't remember who I did."255 From the same police interview she said "I hate
him [Mr. Maese], he's a little fucker, you know, and even on bad people I don't wish
248

R. at 320 (Tr. 234:23-235:2, July 11, 2008.).

249

R. at 81 (Tr. 73:15-17, April 3, 2007.).

250

R. at 320 (Tr. 240:19-21, July 11, 2008.).

251

R. at 81 (Tr. 74:18-24, April 3, 2007.).

252

R. at 320 (Tr. 245:5-25, July 11, 2008.)

253

R. at 11 (Probable Cause Statement at | 5 , § a.).

254

R. at 320 (Tr. 245:7-12, July 11, 2008.).

255

R. at 320 (Tr. 245:24-25, July 11, 2008.).
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bad things but I just wish you know, I'll tell you so that he can get his everything gone"
Fernandez acknowledged that she "remember [ed] saying a few words out of anger, I
do, yeah." 256 She only later agreed to provide contrary damaging testimony against Mr.
Maese in exchange for a plea-in-abeyance on an unrelated criminal charge. 257
When asked about the contradictions regarding prostitution in her testimony, Fernandez replied "If I answered any of the questions like that to the cops it's because I
thought they were going to try and charge me with more stuff." That answer alone,
however, demonstrates her testimony's inherent improbability. If Fernandez was afraid
that the police would charge her with prostitution for sexual activity with clients, she
would have denied prostituting herself with her own clients as well as Doll House
clients. Furthermore, she testified that she failed to remember exactly whom she "did;"
this negates her recollection of events transpiring between her and Mr. Maese. Finally,
her recollection and motivation from a police interview conducted before the start of
trial would necessarily support that she was honest at that time.
On many crucial details, Fernandez' trial testimony is at complete odds with her
preliminary hearing testimony. And her testimony in both venues contradicts her prior
statements to police and the testimony given by all of the State's other witnesses. These
direct lies and contradictions display Nicole Fernandez's testimony's inherent improbability; her uncorroborated testimony was blatantly false.258
256

R. at 320 (Tr. 248:20-249:3, July 11, 2008.).
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A text of Nicole Fernandez's complete police interview is found at R. at 524-86; her
preliminary hearing testimony is found at R. 81 (Tr. 66:1-90:20, April 3, 2007); and
her trial testimony is found at R. 320 (Tr. 230:10-252:22, July 11, 2008).
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D. The State failed to prove Mr. Maese violated a Pattern of Unlawful Activity.
As described above, Mr. Maese was charged with violating specific sections of Utah's
Pattern of Unlawful Activity statute. The sections he was charged with read as follows:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived,
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity... to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income... in the acquisition
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.259
Here, the State failed to prove the three predicate episodes — episodes limited to the
charged conduct contained with the Information.260 — required by a Pattern of Unlawful
Activity's definition.261 Beyond that failure, the State failed to prove a nexus between a
Pattern of Unlawful Activity and an enterprise as required by the law.
The State failed to introduce any evidence that Mr. Maese used profits from Exploiting Prostitution to acquire, establish, or operate any enterprise; it failed to introduce any
evidence that Mr. Maese acquired or maintained, either directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise through Exploiting Prostitution. Finally, the State
failed to introduce any evidence that Mr. Maese directly or indirectly conducted or participated in any enterprise's affairs through Exploiting Prostitution.

259

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603.

260

R. at 9 ("...as indicated in Counts TWO through FIVE of this Information.").
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2) (2006).
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E. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maese acted
with the required mens rea.
The trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the mens rea required for Exploiting
Prostitution and Pattern of Unlawful Activity, yet statutory construction and legal
precedent demonstrate that the mens rea for both is purposeful.
Each Exploiting Prostitution subsection articulates an intentional mens rea wherein it
states, "(a) ...procures... or places an inmate... (b) otherwise purposely causes... (c)
transports... with a purpose to promote... prostitution... (d) shares the proceeds of
prostitution... pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein... (e) owns,
controls, manages, or otherwise keeps"262; furthermore, "the gist of the offense of 'keeping a house of ill fame7 [Subsection (e)'s predecessor] is the management, control and
operation of it."263
Despite Exploiting Prostitution requiring intentional mens rea, the prosecutor acknowledged in his closing that the evidence he introduced proved only knowledge:
This is money coming in for prostitution and he knows it. We've established
knowledge.264
Now again, we have to show knowledge and the evidence as it's come in shows
knowledge.265
Knowledge. The State had the burden of showing knowledge, knowledge on the
part of the defendant of what was taking place with his escorts. 266
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1).
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State v. Davie, 240 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1952) (internal quotations added).
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Here's your specific incidents of conduct that describes both the knowledge that
the defendant has...267
Do you think the defendant has knowledge when he edits this letter and sends it
to the mother of one of his employees?268
She told them about it, there's your knowledge, and they still took that agency
fee despite what had happened.269
Although the State argued the incorrect standard to the jury — explaining why the jury
felt justified in convicting Mr. Maese —the evidence showed that Mr. Maese could have
known that escorts working for The Doll House had engaged in prostitution; though
only through after-the-fact accounts from escorts.270 But the State failed to prove Mr.
Maese knew escorts would prostitute themselves prior to any appointment. Mr. Maese
advertised for and hired people to work as escorts for The Doll House and escorts were
never required to engage in prostitution.271 This demonstrates that he failed to employ
escorts for the purpose —and intent —that they engage in prostitution. The evidence
demonstrated that Mr. Maese edited and sent a letter to Alyson Jensen's mother which
alleged that she had engaged in prostitution.272 The letter shows that Mr. Maese knew
that Jensen prostituted herself.273 Yet the letter cannot provide a temporal reference to
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R. at 320 (Tr. 348:15-19, July 11, 2008.).
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R. at 320 (Tr. 349:19-21, July 11, 2008.).
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show that (1) Mr. Maese knew she prostituted herself while working for The Doll
House and (2) then used that knowledge to commit a crime.
The evidence is insufficient to prove Mr. Maese acted with any mens rea greater than
knowledge and Exploiting Prostitution fails to provide a crime with that intent.
*

*

*

The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain the charges against Mr. Maese for
three reasons. First, the evidence introduced at trial contained fatal variances from Mr.
Maese's Information and Probable Cause Statement. Second, the State failed to prove vital Exploiting Prostitution elements, virtually ignoring Exploiting Prostitution's attendant circumstances. Finally, the State failed to prove the charged crimes mens rea
element. Accordingly, the convictions against Mr. Maese should be vacated.
POINT IV. The trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding Pattern of Unlawful Activity's charged elements; a fatal variance from the information. This allowed the jury to convict Mr. Maese of an uncharged
Pattern of Unlawful Activity alternative.
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in relevant part that "[a]n indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted by... statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient
to give the defendant notice of the charge/' 274 And in discussing what constitutes a valid information, this Court held that "the information provided to [the Defendant] contained the charge [], the name of the victim, the date and place of the crime, and the
relevant text of the [] statute."275 This rule solidifies the Utah Constitution's guarantees

274

UtahR.Crim.P.4(b).

275

State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, t i l , 56 P.3d 969.
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that an accused may know "the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to
have a copy thereof"276 and that these offenses "shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate." 277
The Information in Mr. Maese's case failed to charge Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603
(4), the Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act's conspiracy alternative; 278 the charges read by
the trial court to the jury did not recite this subsection. 279 That subsection provides:
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).280
Yet Jury Instruction NQ 37 included the Conspiracy Alternative and stated:
Before you can convict STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE [sic] of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, as charged in the information, you must find... STEVEN
SANTIAGO MAESE [sic], did commit an unlawful act or acts as defined: ...
d. did conspire to commit any unlawful act as described in paragraphs a, b, or c
above. 281
Although the Information contains the words "conspired" and "conspiracy," the State
notified Mr. Maese only that it may consider conspiracy as an inchoate offense. The
Conspiracy Alternative exists to elevate conspiring to violate Utah's Pattern of Unlaw-
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12.
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Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 13.
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R. at 8-9.
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ful Activity Act from an inchoate offense to a primary offense;282 allowing the State to
charge conspiracy as a second degree felony instead of a third degree felony.
In Orem City v. Martineau, this Court held that "well-established principles of statutory construction require that a more specific statute governs instead of a more general
statute." 283 Therefore, in charging Mr. Maese under Pattern of Unlawful Activity's Conspiracy Alternative, the Amended Information is fatally defective and Jury Instruction
NQ 37 is erroneous. In State v. Dunn the Utah Supreme Court held that, "The remedy for
an erroneous jury instruction is a new trial." 284 This error should have been obvious to
the trial court. Moreover, because the State's evidence was largely conspiratorial, the instruction severely prejudiced Mr. Maese's defense by encouraging the jury to convict
him under a statute subsection the State failed to charge him with.

CONCLUSION
All trials have errors, and Mr. Maese understands that he is entitled to a fair trial, not a
perfect one. This Court, however, requires less than a preponderance of the evidence to
show that if the errors addressed here had never taken place, the outcome would be different. This is because "thoughtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome
may be undermined at some point substantially short of the 'more probable than not'
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See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-202, 76-4-301 (2008).
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Orem City v. Martineau, 2006 UT App 136, f 6,135 P.3d 884 (quotations and citations
omitted).
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State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1229 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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portion of the spectrum/'285 Therefore, confidence in the verdict is undermined at some
point substantially short of greater than fifty percent.
The justice system has a "duty to ensure a fair trial."286 Because numerous errors affecting Mr. Maese's substantial rights occurred, this Court's only avenue to ensure Mr.
Maese receives a fair trial is to grant him a new one.
WHEREFORE, Mr.

Maese respectfully requests this Court order his convictions va-

cated; or alternatively, reverse the trial court's judgment, and grant him a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on

this 3 rd day of June, 2009.

S. Steven Maese
Appellant Pro Se
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Addendum A

RULE 4 PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give
the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied
by a statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense
charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value
and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such
things as money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments
may be described by any name or description by which they are generally known or
by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details
concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither
presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars.
The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such
later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the
filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented
at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and
contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information
needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning.

RULE 12 MOTIONS.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the
record.
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.

RULE 606 COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS.

Utah Rules of Evidence
Article VI—Witnesses
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything
upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes
in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor
may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter
about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah
Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662
(1972).

76-10-1301.

DEFINITIONS.

Title 76-Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10 —Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals
Section 1301 — Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "House of prostitution" means a place where prostitution or promotion of
prostitution is regularly carried on by one or more persons under the control,
management, or supervision of another.
(2) "Inmate" means a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency
of a house of prostitution.
(3) "Public place" means any place to which the public or any substantial group of
the public has access.
(4) "Sexual activity" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any sexual
act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person, regardless of the sex of either participant.
Amended by Chapter 199,1988 General Session

76-10-1305.

EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION.

Title 76-Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10 —Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals
Section 1305 — Exploiting prostitution.
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of
prostitution for one who would be an inmate;
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or
remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that
person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for transportation
with that purpose;
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares the proceeds of
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to
share therein; or
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business.
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree.
Amended by Chapter 1, 2000 General Session

76-10-1603.

UNLAWFUL ACTS.

Title 76-Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 10 — Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals
Section 1603 - Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person
has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to acquire or
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to
conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection
(1), (2), or (3).
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 238,1987 General Session

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section 12. Rights of accused persons
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
Section 13. Prosecution by information or indictment—Grand jury
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination
be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the
powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CHAD L. PLATT, 8475
Deputy District Attorneys
111 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:(801)363-7900

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: C. Piatt
Assigned to: C. Piatt

Plaintiff,
BAIL: PTS
Warrant/Release: Summons / Surrender
DAO# 6018158

-vsSTEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE,
DOB 12/06/76
Aka NONE
602-32-2315
2650 E. 3300 S. #5

AMENDED
INFORMATION

Defendant.
TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS,

Case No. 061906590

Co-Defendant.
The undersigned, Detective D. Bartlett - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case
No 2006-28791, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the
crimes of:
COUNT I
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, attempted, conspired, solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided another to participate as a principal in a pattern of unlawful activity intending
to receive directly or indirectly, proceeds derived from that pattern of unlawful activity to be
invested in the acquisition of an interest in the establishment or operation of an enterprise
contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, or
did acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise through a
pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(2), Utah Code

DAO#6018158
Annotated, 1953 as amended, or did become persons employed by or associated with an
enterprise intending to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the functions of the
enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section
1603(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and committed an act or acts in the pursuance
of such attempt or conspiracy; to-wit: between the dates of July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006,
the defendants did exploit prostitution in at least three separate episodes which are not isolated,
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victim, or methods of commission, as
indicated in Counts TWO through FIVE of this Information.
NOTICE is given that the defendants' STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY
FRENCH CURTIS, interest in any property or proceeds from the conduct prohibited in Count I
is subject to forfeiture pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(5),
1953 as amended. NOTICE is further given pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-10-1603.5 that the district
attorney seeks the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense described in Count I, to be
paid by defendant, in lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, and that the defendant be fined
not more than twice the amount of the net proceeds derived from the conduct engaged in and
prohibited by Section 76-10-1603.
COUNT II
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
COUNT III
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.

DAO# 6018158
COUNT IV
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
COUNT V
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
COUNT VI
MONEY LAUNDERING, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East and in and around
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1903, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as party to
the offense, did transport, receive, or acquired property which was in fact proceeds of unlawful
activity, to wit: Exploitation of a Prostitute, knowing that the property involved represented the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, or made proceeds of unlawful activity available to
another by transaction or transportation, or other means, knowing that it was intended to be used
for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of specified unlawful activity.

DAO# 6018158

THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Detective D. Bartlett; Sgt. Paul Brenneman; witnesses N.F., A.F., H.T., H.R., J.H., D.T.,
T.N.,H.W.,M.H.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:
1.
D House LLC, aka "Doll House" is a registered sexually oriented business
("SOB") in Summit County, Park City. Doll House is not a registered SOB in any city within
Salt Lake County. The registered owners of D House LLC are TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS
("CURTIS") and STEVEN SANTIAGO MEESE ("MEESE").
2.
In March of 2006, the Cottonwood Heights Precinct of the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office received complaints that the residence located at 7567 South 2160 East, in Salt
Lake County, was operating as an SOB, specifically, as the escort agency, Doll House.
3.
In March and April, 2006, Detective Dan Bartlett ("Bartlett") conducted trashcovers at 7567 S. 2160 East. In both instances Bartlett discovered discarded customer names,
addresses, and escort names on company letterhead, along with appointment dates and meeting
times, consistent with an SOB being operated without an SOB license.
4.
In an investigation based upon names obtained from the trash covers, as well as
the Doll House Web Site which contained a link to "theeroticreview.com" ("TER") - a website
that gives reviews of escorts, written by patrons, Bartlett discovered hundreds of reviews on TER
which describe specific sexual acts Doll House escorts have performed.
5.
Detective Bartlett conducted numerous interviews with current and past "escort"
employees of the Doll House. Each interviewee describes an ongoing pattern by which MEESE
and CURTIS aided and encouraged prostitution, and received the proceeds from the
appointments. A non-exhaustive description of MEESE and CURTIS' activities as related by
escorts follows:
a.
N.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between July and September of
2005 stated taht MEESE would tell her when a customer was a "reg" (a regular) and would
explain what likes the "reg" had, such as oral sex. N.F. describes one particular instance where
MEESE ordered her to an appointment where the customer wanted sex. N.F. tried not to have
sex, and the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then called N.F. and told her "B*tch,
you're gonna have to make it work." N.F. states when she attempted to leave Doll House,
MEESE threatened her. N.F. states she was not given many appointments because she would not
have sex with clients.
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b.
A.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between October and Decemberl
of 2005, states that MEESE threatened her if she did not continue working for Doll House. A.F.
states CURTIS regularly encouraged good reviews on TER, and specifically encouraged bbbjj
which is a term for oral sex without a condom. A.F. states that CURTIS made clear that if she!
did not tip the phone girl, which was usually her self (the person that sets appointments), she
would not get any more appointments.
c.
H.T., who worked as a Doll House escort between January and March of
2006, states she did have sex with clients for money, and that she always paid CURTIS out at the
cottonwood address following the appointments. H.T. states for the first four appointments, the
entire $145.00 agency fee went to Doll House, plus 20% of any tips. H.T. states that not all
customers received intercourse - approximately 1 in 8, but that manual sex was frequent and
easy, approximately 7 in 8.
d.
H.R., who worked as a Doll House escort between September 2005 and
February 2006, states that she did have intercourse with clients for money, but usually provided
manual or oral sex because it was easy. H.R. states that MEESE and CURTIS told her that if she
ever got arrested for prostitution, to not say anything, and they would provide a lawyer for her.
e.
J.H., who worked as a Doll House escort between November and
December of 2005, states that MEESE told her they would pay for a lawyer if she would not talk
to police. J.H. states that money was paid out to CURTIS and/or MEESE at the Cottonwood
address every time. J.H. states that CURTIS told her that clients would ask for sex every time.
J.H. states that she did have sex with men for money, and would pay CURTIS 20% of the tips.
J.H. describes as an example one occasion being paid $1,000 for an appointment where she had
sex, paying out $100 for the "agency fee" and then an additional $200 to CURTIS as a tip.
f.
D.T., who worked as a Doll House escort between April and May of 2006,
[states that she was sent on 3 to 4 dates per day in the beginning. D.T. states that she would have
sex for money while working for the Doll House. D.T. describes on one particular occasion
being asked by a customer to have sexual intercourse for $200.00 without a condom. When D.T.
refused, the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then got on the phone and told D.T.
ito drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and "work something out."

INFORMATION - MAES
DAO# 6018158

g.
T.N., who worked as a Doll House escort for approximately one year
between 2005 and 2006, states that in practice the girls frequently told CURTIS and MEESE of
the specific sex acts they perform, and that they are required to tip 20% of the "tip" received by
customers to the call girl that sets the appointment, which was normally CURTIS. T.N. states
that CURTIS frequently called her and asked her to go to an appointment because the particular
customer wanted a specific sexual act which other girls are notwilling to perform.

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of October, 2006.

Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, District-Attorney

Deputy District Attorney"
October ^ ^ 2 0 0 6
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Addendum C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 061906590

:

S. STEVEN MAESE,

:

Defendant.

:

The Court has before

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

it the defendant S. Steven Maese's

Maese") Motion for Arrest of Judgment and/or For a New Trial.

("Mr.
The

matters have been fully and extensively briefed and the parties argued
the matter before the Court on October 27, 2008.

The matter is now ready

for decision.
BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2008, after a two day jury trial, the jury returned
guilty verdicts against Mr. Maese in the above-entitled matter on the
following counts:
Count I - Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a Second Degree Felony
Counts II, III, IV, V - Exploiting Prostitution, Third Degree
Felonies
The jury acquitted Mr. Maese on Count VI, Money Laundering, a Second
Degree Felony.

The charges arose as a result of Mr. Maese's ownership

and operation of an escort service named the "Doll House," which was a
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sexually oriented business, licensed in Park City, Summit County, Utah.1
The Doll House, however, under Mr. Maese's ownership, was operated out
of a residence in Cottonwood Heights, located in Salt Lake County, where
the co-owner of the business, Tiffany Curtis
While

the Doll House held

itself

("Ms. Curtis"), resided.

out to be an escort

service, the

overwhelming weight of evidence produced at trial indicated it provided
more client services than merely those associated with an escort service,
but rather services which included sex acts, and the owners, the escorts
and their clientele understood, or came to understand quite quickly, that
prostitution was a service the Doll House and its escorts provided, and
that anywhere from 50% to 90% of the Doll House customers fully expected
and received some type of sexual activity from a Doll House escort.
Legal Discussion
A.

Motion to Arrest Judgment
At the conclusion of the trial, and prior to sentencing, Mr. Maese

filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, or, in the Alternative, a Motion
for a New Trial.

Motions to arrest Judgment are governed by Utah Rule

of Criminal Procedure 23:
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court
upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant
shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill,
or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment....

1

Mr. Maese owned the Doll House with his then girlfriend, Tiffany Curtis, who had
formerly worked as an escort, and had advised Mr. Maese about the "business" opportunities
associated with an escort service. The Doll House was licensed in Park City, and maintained a
small office there, but did no actual business from the Park City location.
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Under Rule 23, a trial court should arrest Judgment if the evidence
presented by the State or admitted to by a defendant "is so inconclusive
or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element," that
is, if it is factually insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict.
See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) .

Thus, when Mr.

Maese attacks the jury's verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, or lack
of

unanimity,

sentenced.

it may be

considered

under

Rule

23 prior

to being

Mr. Maese urges the Court that it should arrest Judgment both

because of the alleged insufficiency of the evidence and the lack of
unanimity of the jury verdict.
B.

Motion for a New Trial2
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the basis

upon which a new trial may be granted.

The Court may grant a new trial

in the interest of justice if "there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."

Mr. Maese urges the Court to grant him a new trial because of the
same two bases as set forth above, and various errors he ascribes to the
Court, including not ruling upon, or compelling the State, to provide a

2

The State correctly notes that a Motion for New Trial should be filed after sentencing.
See, Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. While Mr. Maese concurs with the
State's assessment, he argues that Rule 23 permits a trial Court to exercise "wide discretion" in
any considerations for the arrest of judgment, and that his arguments may be considered for both.
This Court will consider all of the arguments of Mr. Maese without worrying whether the
Motion for a New Trial could be considered now or later.
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bill of particulars, permitting evidence to be presented to the jury of
one

of

the

escort's

non-consensual

sex acts,

allowing

the

jury

to

consider four alternative statutory prongs as a basis for the Pattern of
Unlawful

Activity

charge,

permitting

the

introduction

of

a

letter

addressed to the parents of one of the escorts, penned by Mr. Maese, and
actions

or

remarks

by

the

prosecutor

which

Mr.

Maese

alleges

was

prosecutorial misconduct and which therefore prejudiced the trial.

Mr.

Maese alleges that any one of these issues had a "substantial adverse
effect" upon his rights.

The Court will address each of these arguments

herein.
1.

Sufficient Evidence was Adduced by the State at Trial that Mr. Maese

is Guilty of the Counts Charged Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
Notwithstanding the mountain of evidence provided at trial and the
jury's verdict of guilt, Mr. Maese now urges the Court that such evidence
was insufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of his
guilt.

In the face of this evidence, it is as if Mr. Maese is asking the

Court to look squarely into the brightness of an unobscured noonday sun
and then seek to persuade the Court that the sun does not exist.

Such

is the quantum of evidence provided at trial to support the jury verdict.

Without attempting to create an exhaustive list of the evidence
provided

at

trial

which

supports

the

jury verdict

on

each

of

the

respective counts, the following is a summary of the evidence provided
at trial concerning the nature of the Doll House's business and the
knowledge of Mr. Maese about the purpose of the business.
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After creation of the Doll House as a business, Mr. Maese and

Ms. Curtis advertised it on a website which provided a link to a site
entitled "The Erotic Review," which was a national posting of reviews of
the places around the country where "erotic" escorts, massages, strip
clubs, and "gentlemen clubs" could be located and the various types of
"service" the clientele could expect from the individuals involved with
a business such as the Doll House.

(Trial Tr. Day 1 ("Tl") 16.) Mr.

Maese put together the Doll House website, monitored the "reviews" his
escorts received (Tl 84), wrote his own fictitious reviews of the sexual
acts his escorts would perform for paying clients (Tl 117) and discussed
bad reviews with the escorts to encourage them to generate "positive"
reviews (Tl 114-15) . He specifically spoke to the escorts that refusing
sex was bad for business and would result in a bad review.
(b)

(Tl 125-27)

The Doll House employed numerous women as escorts, who were

sent to various appointments, in which they were required to become
completely naked.
created

a

"Policy

(Trial Transcript Day 2 ("T2") 270.) While Mr. Maese
& Procedures

Handbook"

for the Doll

House

that

explicitly prohibited sexual acts, it was understood that sex was the
service the Doll House provided.3

3

This was certainly true as to the

A theme of Mr. Maese's defense was, that while escorts may have engaged in sex acts,
he was oblivious to such activity and he presumed the business was only providing escort
services that did not involve sex acts. Indeed, as part of his defense, Mr. Maese introduced
evidence at trial that he had drafted a "policy and procedure manual" that explained that sex acts
were not allowed by law or by the Doll House, and held at least two quarterly business meetings
where escorts were trained by a legal professional as to what legally could or could not be done
as an escort. As will be seen by a cursory review of the evidence, this was a facade, as the
evidence suggests Mr. Maese fully understood sex was part of the service the Doll House
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owners, Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis, who did all they could to make the Doll
House a successful and lucrative concern.

Financial success for an

escort and for the Doll House involved sexual activity.
(c)

Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis often obtained the details of the

escort's individual appointments, including the following low lights:
(i)

one escort noted to Mr. Maese that during an appointment

where she performed oral sex the client "tasted" disgusting.

(Tl 87-88);

(ii) another escort complained to Mr. Maese that other escorts
were not charging enough for sex so clients were reluctant to pay her the
price she demanded for sex (Tl 103) , to which Mr. Maese told her that the
fee she charged for sex was too much.

(Tl 103, T2 187); and

(iii) Mr. Maese told the escorts to "keep the guys happy but
whatever happens between you guys is between you guys" (Tl 152-53);
(iv) Mr. Maese attended a bachelor party with two of his
escorts where oral sex was performed with clients. Mr. Maese accompanied
the escorts to the event and called the Doll House to report they had
arrived and collected the Doll House fee (Tl 97-98);
(v) Mr. Maese told an escort during a dispute with a "regular"
client over the fee for sexual intercourse that she was to go to a gas

provided, he actively participated in "marketing" the types of sexual activity individual escorts
would perform by creating fictitious reviews by supposed satisfied clientele, encouraged the
escorts to provide the sex acts the clients demanded, and demanded that his escorts satisfy the
clients and obtain "good" reviews from their clientele. The idea that sex acts were not permitted
is more appropriately called a "wink, wink" defense, wherein Mr. Maese tells an escort not to do
something, but fully expects them to do exactly that.
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station, purchase condoms and go back and make the guy happy because he
was a "regular." (T2 186);
(vi) An escort told Mr. Maese that she had performed oral sex
for $400 and Mr. Maese responded that for $400 she would need "to be a
little more liberal than that." (T2 235-36); and
(vii) In a dispute with an escort who left the Doll House to
work with a competitor, Mr. Maese drafted and sent a letter to the
escort's parents highlighting the sexual activities she had engaged in
while an escort at the Doll House, which letter included photographs and
the "reviews" she had received from The Erotic Review.
35)

(Tl 100-02, 133-
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(viii) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis referred to the escorts who
were willing to have sex with a client as "bailers" and/or that they
would "play ball." (Testimony of Ms. Curtis) 4
(ix) Mr. Maese was present at least 70% of the time when one
escort returned from appointments and paid the agency fee and was seen
by

this

escort

handling

and wrapping

the money

in rubber

bands.

(Testimony of Allison H . ) 5
(x) A typical escort would do three to four dates a day,
worked

a

50

hour

work

week

and

engaged

approximately 50% of the appointments.

in

sexual

activity

on

(Testimony of Jennifer H.)

(xi) One escort was involved in a non-consensual sex act from
a regular client and she informed Mr. Maese, and he responded that the
Doll House would never provide services to that client again.

(Testimony

of Heather T.)
(xii) The witnesses testified that from 30% to 90% of the
appointments

scheduled

by

the

Doll

House

involved

sexual

acts.

(Testimony of Allison H., Jennifer H., Heather W., Danielle T., Allison
J.)
(xiii) Mr. Maese arranged some of the escort appointments with
clients and drove the escorts to the location.

(Testimony of Nicole F.)

4

Where the Court cites to testimony rather than to a reference in the trial transcript, it is
because the Court does not have a trial transcript and is relying on its own trial notes. Where a
trial transcript is referenced, it has been taken from the briefs of one of the litigants.
5

The witnesses who were escorts at the Doll House will be referred to in this Decision by
their first name and last initial.

(xiv)
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In addition

to a Doll

House

fee

of

$95

for

each

appointment, the escorts paid Ms. Curtis, the appointment scheduler, a
"tip" of from ten to twenty percent of any additional money the escort
earned from engaging in sex acts, which was commingled with Doll House
fees.

(T2 222, 226) .
(xv) The more "tip" Ms. Curtis and the Doll House received

from an escort, the more appointments the escort received.

(T2 149-50,

182)
(xvi) The Erotic Review, reviewed and supplemented by Mr.
Maese, detailed the sex acts the Doll House escorts performed.

(Tl 12-

16, 82-84, 114-115, 127)
(xvii) Mr. Maese checked the reviews of his escorts in The
Erotic Review daily and discussed with Ms. Curtis and the escorts their
respective reviews.

(Tl 84, 114-115, 117, 125-27)

(xviii) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll
House, law enforcement discovered hard copies of The Erotic Review which
detailed the sexual repertoire of the Doll House escorts.

(Tl 23)

(xix) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll
House,

law

enforcement

retrieved

escort

schedule

lists,

escort

appointment lists, business application for the Doll House signed by Mr.
Maese, and Doll House financial accounts signed by Mr. Maese, as well as
financial records of money transfers from the Doll House to Mr. Maese's
personal financial account.
(xx)

Mr.

Maese

(Testimony of Detective Dan Bartlett)
and

Ms.

Curtis

abandoned

the

quarterly

discussions with escorts about prohibitions against sex on appointments
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because they "did not want the girls to think that they would get in
trouble...if they were to have sex on an appointment."

(Tl 72-80)

(xxi) In a meeting with all the escorts, Mr. Maese went over
The Erotic Review, and encouraged the escorts to work harder, provide
more "services" for less money and generate better reviews so the Doll
House could become the best escort service in Salt Lake City.

(Testimony

of Allison J.)
(xxii) Mr. Maese spoke to one escort on strategies to employ
to avoid getting busted for illegal sexual activity.

(Testimony of

Jennifer H.)
(xxiii) The escorts felt pressure to provide sex on their
appointments from the Doll House owners.
•

*

(Testimony of Jennifer H.)

*

When a Court is asked to review a jury verdict on the grounds that
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, the Court is to:
...review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of
the jury.
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d

232, 236

(Utah 1992)

(quoting State v.

Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).)
As set forth in this Court's summary recitation of the evidence,
there is nothing insufficient or inconclusive in the evidence the State
presented

of Mr. Maese's

reasonable doubt.

guilt

to

support

his

conviction

beyond

a

Evidence of guilt is sufficient when a jury, based on

the

evidence, may

find beyond

committed the charged offenses.
1980).
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a reasonable

doubt

that

a defendant

State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah

Each piece of evidence does not need to be sufficient, in and of

itself, to support a jury finding of guilt.
241-42 (Utah App. 1995).

State v. Gurr, 904 P. 2d 238,

Rather, a court is to review the evidence in

its totality to determine whether the totality of facts is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In Gurr, the defendant argued that his conviction was not supported
by

sufficient

evidence. .Id. at 240.

To support his arguments, he

isolated each piece of evidence presented by the prosecution, arguing
that each by itself was insufficient to convict him.

Ld. at 242.

The

court rejected his arguments stating, "Although Gurr offers alternative
explanations for pieces of the evidence, those explanations would require
us to view the evidence as individual still frames rather than a whole
moving picture."

Id.

Mr. Maese is asking this Court to engage in the same limited view
of each piece of evidence against him.
totality,

the jury correctly

But viewing the evidence in its

found that Mr. Maese knew the escorts

working for him were performing sex acts for money, that he accepted
money

they received

from

prostitute themselves.

the work, and that he encouraged

them to

Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305, provides that a

person may be found guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in
a house of prostitution...;
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another
to become or remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person...within this state with a purpose to
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promote that person engaging in prostitution...;
(d) ...shares the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute
pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein;
or
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps,
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution
or a prostitution business.
In

the

face

of

the

quantum

of

evidence

presented

at

trial

it

is

an

impossible task for Mr. Maese to argue that the quantum of evidence is
insufficient or inconclusive as to his guilt.
task

The impossibility of that

is only highlighted by each of the pieces of evidence Mr. Maese

tries to explain away.

Indeed, from Mr. Maese's own marshaling of the

evidence and arguments thereon, one may conclude that:
(i) Mr. Maese encouraged an escort who was unwilling to have
unprotected
happy."

sex to go get some condoms, work it out and make

Exploitation

of

Prostitution

may

be

proven

by

"the guy

encouraging,

inducing or causing a person to become or remain a prostitute;

(ii) Unhappy with a different escort who left the Doll House,
Mr. Maese sent a letter to her parents detailing her sexual activity as
an escort for the Doll House.

Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven

by the ownership, control or management of a prostitution business;
(iii) Mr. Maese received proceeds from a sexual encounter by
a Doll House escort for which she was forced to perform a sexual act for
less than she demanded, and received money from the escorts from their
appointments.

Exploitation of Prostitution may be shown by the sharing

of proceeds of prostitution.
(iv) Mr. Maese maintained a house of prostitution by setting
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up a website, handling advertisements, writing reviews of his escorts on
The Erotic Review which contained

information

Exploitation

be

of

Prostitution

may

shown

about

by

sexual activity.

owning,

controlling,

managing or supervising a prostitution business.
Furthermore, the "low lights" list of activity stated above, the
State

provided

sufficient

and

conclusive

evidence

to

support

claims

against Mr. Maese for exploiting prostitution, including the following:
(a) Procuring an individual to engage in prostitution :
Mr. Maese interviewed, photographed, hired, trained and advertised for
the Doll House

escorts.

Without

exception, each of the escorts

interviewed and hired by Mr. Maese.

were

One escort was drawn to the Doll

House for employment by an ad she saw for the Doll House in a weekly
newspaper.

(Testimony of Allison J.)
(b) Encouraging another to Become or Remain a Prostitute:

Mr.

Maese

coached

the escorts

on what

they

could

do to avoid

being

busted, he discussed their Erotic Reviews and encouraged better service
for less money, commented on their pricing for sexual services if he felt
it was too much or if they needed to provide more service for the price
received,

told them to keep their customers satisfied, and operated a

business that gave the escorts referrals based on how much of a tip the
Doll House received for the sexual activity of its escorts.
(c) Transports a person with purpose to promote prostitution:
Mr.

Maese

drove

escorts

to several

appointments,

at one of which he

remained to take photographs.
(d) Shares in proceeds of prostitution: Mr. Maese and the Doll
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House collected tips from sexual activity of his escorts along with the
standard agency fees.
(e) Owned or controlled a prostitution business : Mr. Maese
owned, operated and oversaw the business operation of the Doll House.
After a review of the evidence, this Court concludes that the jury
had sufficient and conclusive evidence as to the counts of Exploiting
Prostitution to find Mr. Maese guilty on those charges.

There is neither

good cause to arrest the Judgment nor any error or impropriety that had
a substantial adverse effect upon Mr. Maese's rights to warrant a new
trial.

As to the charge of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, those same facts
support

this

Court's

conclusion

that

the

jury

had

sufficient

and

conclusive evidence as to the count for a Pattern of Unlawful Activity.
2.

Mr. Maese Received a Unanimous Verdict From the Jury
Mr. Maese seeks to introduce evidence of jurors' statements that

they were confused during deliberations by the Court's

instructions

regarding the specific acts that constitute Exploitation of Prostitution
and their duty of returning a unanimous verdict.
Mr. Maese argues that his verdict was not a unanimous verdict from
the jury as three jurors expressed some confusion during deliberations
concerning the jury instructions as it related to what specific acts may
be

found by

the

jury

in order

to return a verdict

on a count

of

Exploitation of Prostitution.
As previously noted, one may be guilty of Exploiting Prostitution
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under five alternative categories of the crime.
(a)

They include:

procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution;

(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another
to become or remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person into or within this state, with the
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution...;
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute share
the proceeds of prostitution...; or

(e) owns,
alone

or

in

controls, manages

association

with

another,

supervises
a house

or otherwise keeps,

of

prostitution

or

a

prostitution business.
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305

(1953, as amended.)

During the jury deliberations, the jurors sent out the
question

in referring

to

the

elements

section

of

the

following

instruction

on

Exploiting Prostitution:
Jury Question: In instruction #37, a, b, c, d, do all of them
have to be fulfilled in order to find the defendant guilty or
just one of the conditions met?
Also the same question for
instruction #40.
The Court, after consultation with respective counsel submitted the
following:
Answer: Both instructions 37 and 40's subparagraphs (the a, b,
c's) you refer to end with the word "or" and therefore should
be read accordingly.
Mr. Maese's argument is that the jury may have found him guilty on
different

categories

of the offense, but not unanimously

on the

same
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Mr. Maese's argument is unpersuasive both based on the Utah

Rules of Evidence and on case law.
(i) Utah Rule of Evidence 606 Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements
Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) forbids the use of juror statements Mr.
Maese gathered as to matters occurring during deliberations.

Rule 606(b)

states in part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,

a juror
occurring

may not testify
during
the

as

to any
course

matter
of

or
the

statement
jury's

deliberations...except
that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror.
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah law is clear as to the strictness of this rule.
498 P. 2d 662, 665-66

(Utah 1972)

See, State v.

Gee,

(specifying that juror testimony or

affidavits may not be received to impeach the jury verdict).

All of the

statements provided by defense counsel allude to matters and statements
which

occurred

deliberations.

and

were

made

during

the

course

of

the

jury's

Therefore, they may not be received for the purposes of

impeaching the verdict in seeking a new trial.
Rule 606(b) allows for consideration of juror testimony only to the
extent

that

it

may

suggest

information" in deliberations.

the

entry

of

"extraneous

prejudicial

The mere fact that several jurors were

confused as to their duty of unanimity as to a specific crime and as to
each element of that crime does not qualify as extraneous prejudicial
information

or

improper

influence

for admission

under

Rule

606(b),
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especially where that confusion was specifically addressed by the trial
court and resolved.

The Utah Supreme court has expressly held:

In a long line of decisions in this jurisdiction, the
principle has been firmly established that evidence by
affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to
impeach or question the jury verdict or to show the grounds

upon which it was rendered, or to show their
misunderstanding
of fact or law, or that they misunderstood
the charge of the
court,
or the effect of their verdict, or their opinions,
surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict.
State v. Gee,
Simons,

551

supra
P.2d

at 665-66
515,

516

(emphasis added) ; see also, Johnson v.
(Utah

1976)

(refusing

juror

affidavits

indicating that jury was confused as to law stated in instructions) . The
introduction of such evidence is expressly barred by Rule 606(b) and by
the clear statements of the Utah Supreme Court.
(ii) Utah Case Law Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements
Mr. Maese cites Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548
(10th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that Federal Rule 606(b) is silent
as to questioning the jury to confirm the accuracy of the verdict, and
therefore

should

not

preclude

miscommunication of the verdict.

the

testimony

as

to

a

potential

The Utah version of Rule 606(b) also

does not specifically preclude evidence of verdict miscommunication.
However, case law is clear that juror testimony may not be used to
impeach or question the verdict or to show a misunderstanding of law or
fact or the charge of the court.

State v. Gee, 498 P. 2d 662, 665-66

(Utah 1972) . The Utah Supreme Court has held that in general jurors must
agree only to the crime charged, not a particular theory of the crime.
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).

In Tillman, the Court noted

STATE V. MAESE

PAGE 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

that there are two classes of criminal statutes: (a) where there is one
crime with various means to commit the crime, and (b) where the statute
sets forth several acts, and commission of each is a separate crime.
When the statute is (a) above (like the one at issue here) , the jury need
only come to consensus about the crime itself, not the elements of the
crime.

Id.

In State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987) the Utah

Supreme Court noted that:
Many jurisdictions have considered
the scope of the
constitutional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in
criminal cases. The decisions are virtually unanimous that a
defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the
precise manner in which the crime was committed, or by which
of several alternative methods or modes, or under which
interpretation of the evidence so long as there is substantial
evidence to support each of the methods, modes, or manners
charged.
Thus, if the statute under which the defendant is convicted defines one
crime which may be committed several different ways, the defendant is not
entitled to jury unanimity on the way in which the crime was committed.
State v. Russell, Id. at 166.
Such is the case here.

Clearly there was sufficient evidence that

the jury could rely upon to find that Mr. Maese (a) procured individuals
to engage in prostitution or

(b) encouraged individuals to become or

remain prostitutes or (c) transported a person within the state to engage
in prostitution or
owned

a

(d) shared in proceeds of prostitution and/or

prostitution

business,

as

has

been

previously

(e)

discussed.

Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and for a New Trial
based on allegations of lack of juror unanimity fails.
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(iii) Even if the Jurors' Statements are Considered, the Jury Requested
and Received a Clarification as to the Courts Instructions, Curing Any
Confusion and Preserving Mr. Maese#s Right to a Unanimous Verdict
The Utah Supreme Court has held that juries are presumed to have
relied on instructions given by the Court.

See, State v. Harmon, 956

P. 2d 262 (Utah 1998) . Mr. Maese asserts that after the jury received the
clarification instruction from the Court "they immediately returned a
guilty verdict on all four counts of Exploiting Prostitution."

This, Mr.

Maese argues, is evidence that the jury "violated [his] constitutional
right to a unanimous verdict."
In this case, the statements of three jurors as to the specific acts
that may have constituted the counts of Exploitation of Prostitution is
argued to have caused some confusion during the deliberations.

However,

the jury brought those questions to the Court, and the Court responded
by clarifying the instruction that had previously been given.

This

response was considered and approved by counsel before returned to the
jury.6

"If a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few

trials would be successfully concluded."

Harmon, 956 P.2d at 272.

Court in this case offered a corrective instruction.

The

It is presumed

under Utah law that it is that clarifying instruction which the jury
followed in rendering their verdict, not some suggestion of personal
confusion related by a juror that preceded this instruction.

6

While Mr. Maese's counsel acknowledges that he reviewed the answer to the jury
question, he does not acknowledge that he "approved" it. There is no record however to suggest
that Mr. Maese's counsel objected to the answer or proposed an alternative instruction.
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Mr. Maese Fails to Demonstrate that the Lack of a Ruling on a Bill

of Particulars Prejudiced Him
Before the Court discusses the argument, a procedural history of
this case bears some discussion.

The Information in this case was

originally filed October 4, 2006, and Amended on October 5, 2006.

The

Amended Information contained a Probable Cause Statement which detailed
over the course of three pages the allegations supporting the criminal
counts brought against Mr. Maese.
After preliminary proceedings the Court set a jury trial for January
9-11,

2008, with

represented

a pretrial

on December

at these proceedings

17, 2007.

by an attorney

Mr. Maese

different

attorney who eventually handled his trial in July of 2008.

than

was
the

On January

7, 2008, approximately ten days before the beginning of the scheduled
jury trial, the parties stipulated to a cancellation of the jury trial
and the trial was reset for February 20 and 21, with a pretrial on
February 11, 2008.

On February 11, 2008, at the pretrial, nine days

before the second time this matter was scheduled for trial, Mr. Maese
moved, through his counsel, to continue the trial, which Motion was
granted.

The trial was reset for a third time on

a pretrial on April 14, 2008.

April 23, 2008, with

At the pretrial on April 14, 2008, Mr.

Maese's counsel indicated that he was prepared to go to trial on April
23, 2008.

However, on the first day of trial, April 23, 2008, Mr. Maese

asked to discharge his lawyer, at which point the Court granted his
counsel's Motion to Withdraw and assessed Mr. Maese costs for the 35
jurors and seven witnesses who were prepared to appear on that day.
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Thereafter, Mr. Athay, Mr. Maese's new trial counsel, made his record of
appearance and the matter was thereafter set for its fourth jury trial
setting on July 10 and 11, 2008, with a pretrial on July 7, 2008.
Thereafter, Mr. Maese filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars,
which was briefed by the parties and argued at the pretrial conference
three days before the jury trial was to begin on its fourth setting.

At

this pretrial conference additional argument was heard by the Court on
a Motion to Disqualify the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
for their prosecution in the matter, which Motion was filed four days
before the pretrial conference, and seven days before the trial was to
begin.

At the pretrial, after hearing arguments from the parties, the

Court indicated it would render a written opinion on the pending Motions
prior to the scheduled trial three days later.

On that same day, July

7, 2008, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order which denied
the defendant's Motion to Disqualify the District Attorney's Office and
indicated to the parties that "the trial will proceed as scheduled."
(Memorandum Decision and Order, July 7, 2008.)

The Court did not include

in that Memorandum Decision any reference to Mr. Maese's Motion for a
Bill of Particulars, and on the day of trial, after asking both the State
and Mr. Maese if they were ready to proceed with the trial, which both
affirmed they were, the trial commenced.

The Court never issued a

decision on Mr. Maese's Motion for a Bill of Particulars.
Mr. Maese argues that the Court's failure to rule on his Motion for
a Bill of Particulars caused him prejudice by depriving him of the
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
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(i) Mr. Maese waived his right to a ruling on the Motion for a Bill
of Particulars.
Rule 12 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "A
motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court

for good

cause

determination."

Rule

orders
12

that

further

the

ruling be deferred

provides

in

subsection

for

later

(f) that,

"Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may
grant relief from such waiver."

When the Court asked Mr. Maese on the

day of trial if they were ready to proceed, and received an affirmative
response, Mr. Maese effectively waived his right to obtain a ruling on
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars by failing to object to the trial
proceeding or to otherwise request the Court to issue its opinion before
the trial began.

Indeed, Mr. Maese should well have known that his

Motion for a Bill of Particulars had been denied when the trial actually
began.
(ii) Mr. Maese suffered no adverse effect for lack of a Ruling on
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars.
a.

The Amended Information Provided Adeguate Notice of the Charges

Against Mr. Maese
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that an
accused ''shall have the right... to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him...."

Utah Code Ann., further provides in § 77-14-

1 that the State provide an accused in writing "As is known to him the
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place, date and time of the commission of the offense charged."

In

interpreting the obligation of the State, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that one "be charged with a specific crime, so that he can know the
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct...."
P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985).

State v. Burnett, 712

Mr. Maese's Motion for a Bill of Particulars

sought the particulars of Counts II through V of the Amended Information,
the Exploitation of Prostitution charges.
Mr. Maese's claim that he was prejudiced by not receiving a ruling
by the Court on his Bill of Particulars is not persuasive.

Mr. Maese was

not deprived of the opportunity to provide an adequate defense. The
Amended Information provided three pages, and nine separate subparagraphs
detailing the particulars of the crime charged. It provides in paragraph
5, the following:
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(a) an escort with initials N.F. was told by Mr. Maese the
type of sex acts she should perform with a client during July
and September, 2005, and further that she was told in response
to a request for sex by a client to work it out;
(b) an escort with initials A.F. was encouraged by Mr. Maese
during October and December 2005 to engage in oral sex without
a condom and that if she didn't engage in sex acts she would
not get work;
(c) an escort with initials H.R. discussed with Maese between
September, 2 0 05 and February, 2 0 06, what to do if she was
charged with Prostitution because of her sexual intercourse
with Doll House clients;
(d) an escort with initials J.H. paid Mr. Maese the Doll House
fee after sex with clients;
(e) an escort with
April and May 2006
sex acts to "drive
and work something

initials D.T. was told by Mr. Maese during
in a dispute with a client over a fee for
down the hill and get condoms and go back
out."

(f) an escort named T.N. told Mr. Maese during the year 2005
and 2006 of the specific sex acts she and the other escorts
performed.
In addition to the particulars set forth in the Amended Information,
Mr. Maese had already been through a preliminary hearing in which dates,
places

and

addition,

times
Mr.

of

Maese,

the

alleged

over

the

illegal

almost

two

conduct
years

had
of

occurred.

pendency

In

of

this

litigation, had received the State's discovery, which included statements
and interviews of the escort witnesses who would be testifying

against

him.
Before Mr. Maese can prevail on his argument
Court

ruling

on his Motion

for a Bill

of

that the lack of a

Particulars

warrants

a

new

trial, he must show that the failure prejudiced him by depriving him of
the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.

Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure

30
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provides

in

subsection

(a)

that

"Any

error,

defect,

irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of
a party shall be disregarded."
For an error to affect the substantial rights of Mr. Maese, he must
show that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been more favorable to the defendant.

State v. Knight,

734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987); see also, State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App. 238,
166 P.3d 626.

This has been interpreted as the "erosion of confidence"

test and requires a two-part analysis:

First, did the error impede the

defendant's ability to prepare for trial?
impede

his

ability

to prepare

a defense

Second, did the error so
that

the

likelihood

of a

different outcome was sufficiently high as to undermine the confidence
in the verdict?

.Id. at 920.

Neither can be met here.

Generally, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 0 puts the burden on the
defendant to show prejudicial error.

See, State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d

688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (court denied Motion where the accused made no
showing that further detail would've made any difference in the trial);
State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) (defendant did not show how his
defense

was

prejudiced

by

the

lack

of

knowledge;

conclusory statement that it was difficult to defend).

he

made

only

a

However, courts

have found that the burden should shift to the State when it comes to a
Motion for Bill of Particulars.

The State must show that there is no

reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial
would have favored the defendant.

See, State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913

(Utah 1987); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 104 (Utah 1998).
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Even if this Court erred in failing to rule on the defendant's
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, such an error does not warrant a new
trial because it did not "affect the substantial rights of a party." Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a).

Put differently, because it is clear

from the record that Mr. Maese was not entitled to a bill of particulars,
any

failure

to issue an Order denying

such bill of particulars

is

rendered harmless.
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778

(Utah 1991), a decision

heavily relied upon by Mr. Maese, the trial court did not explicitly rule
on a Motion to Suppress which it had taken under advisement.

In that

case, however, the failure to issue a ruling on the Motion was harmful
error because during the suppression hearing, there were numerous factual
discrepancies among the testimony of the State's witnesses which were
never ruled upon, and the appellate court was not able to resolve these
factual discrepancies on its own upon appeal.

_Id. at 787.

Because of

the factual discrepancies and the court's failure to resolve them, it was
not clear whether Ramirez was entitled to have the evidence against him
suppressed.

Jd. at 788.

In turn, the court was required to reverse his
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conviction and order a new trial because this was "harmful error."

Id.

at 789.
The case before this Court is different. Unlike the hearing on the
Motion to Suppress

in Ramirez, there was no evidentiary hearing

consider in this case, and no factual discrepancies to consider.
only

issue

sufficient

before
notice

this

Court

through

was

whether

the Amended

Mr.

Maese

Information's

had

to
The

received

probable

cause

statement, and the evidence the State provided to him through discovery
and a preliminary hearing as to what the charges were against him and the
underlying evidence to support those charges, a finding the Court could
make based upon the record.
The record shows that the Amended Information charging Mr. Maese was
constitutionally sufficient.
Ct.

App.

2007),

the

In State v. Bernards, 166 P. 3d 626 (Utah

court

explained

that

an

Information

is

constitutionally sufficient if it fully apprises the defendant of the
"State's evidence upon which the charge is based."

JId.

The court added

that a "[l]ack of factual specificity" does not make an Information
constitutionally deficient.

Further, specific dates are not necessary

when a count is part of an ongoing criminal enterprise.

Jd. at ff 6, 18.

The probable cause statement included with the Amended Information and
the evidence the State provides to the defendant must be considered as
part of the notice to the defendant.

Id.

at f 17.

In Bernards, the

defendant was charged with five counts of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a
Child

for

sexually

abusing

his

stepdaughter

September 2000 and January 23, 2008."

continuously

Id. at 11 2, 4.

"between

The probable
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cause statement described the evidence of each count.

.Id. at 1 5.

Even

though two of the counts for which he was convicted provided a range of
dates--Muring the first part of 2002" and "December 2002" the court held
Bernards received sufficient notice because the abuse was part of a
continuing criminal enterprise, the probable cause statement described
the evidence for each count, and the State provided him with video and
cassette tapes of interviews with the victim and transcripts of the
interviews.

Id. at 11 2, 17-18.

As happened in Bernards, Mr. Maese received sufficient notice.

The

four counts of Exploiting Prostitution for which Mr. Maese sought a Bill
of Particulars gives a date range--like the Information in Bernards--of
July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, and the probable cause statement
outlines

the

evidence

the

State

used

to

charge

him--just

like

the

gave

the

probable cause statement in Bernards.
Moreover,

the probable

cause

statement

in

this

case

initials of former escorts, the dates during which they worked for Mr.
Maese, and detailed accounts that as they worked for Mr. Maese they were
expected to perform sex acts with their clients, and that Mr. Maese
encouraged them in those enterprises.

The Amended Information was more

than sufficient to identify the witnesses against him and review the
evidence occurring during their respective
House.

employment with the Doll

Further, the State provided Mr. Maese with all the evidence it

intended to use against him in response to discovery, including witness
statements.

Furthermore, Mr. Maese had the benefit of a Preliminary

Hearing in which those charges had been more fully laid out.
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Mr. Maese received constitutionally sufficient notice through the
Amended Information, the probable cause statement, and the preliminary
hearing, and the evidence the State provided to him.

Mr. Maese was not

impeded in his preparation for trial by a lack of specificity as to the
charges against him, nor would the outcome have been any different.
Unlike the scenario in Ramirez, there is no risk of harm to Mr. Maese
because that finding is based upon the record.

Mr. Maese's notion that

a new trial would somehow act as a remedy is faulty reasoning because
there is no unresolved factual issue to alter the case--only an unstated
legal ruling which Mr. Maese's counsel himself waived the morning of
trial, by indicating he was ready to proceed to try the case.
4.

Mr. Maese had Adequate Notice of Pattern of Unlawful Activity

Mr.

Maese argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the

Amended Information referred to subsections 1, 2 and 3 of the statutory
provisions for this offense, but not subsection 4, and that the jury
instruction referred to all four subsections,7 thus not permitting Mr.
Maese to be prepared to defend against such a charge.

Subsection 4 of

the statute provides that "it is unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2) or (3)."
As previously noted in reference to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
30(a),

any variance

in the

Information

"which

does not

substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."

7

affect

the

Burnett, 712 P.2d

The Amended Information charges Mr. Maese with a violation of Utah Code Ann., § 7610-1603(3), but in its body continued with a recital of subsections 1, 2 and 3. The recital omits
subsection 4.
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Thus, Mr. Maese must show that the variance prevented him from

having notice of the charge and hindered his ability to defend against
the charge.

State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985).

Here the Amended Information makes specific reference to subsections
(1) , (2) and (3) and, while not making a specific reference to the number
(4),

sets

forth

the

conspiracy

nature

of

the

charge.

The

Amended

Information alleges that the parties conspired to undertake the illegal
activities as outlined in subsections 1-3 and further sets forth that
pursuant to such conspiracy the defendants exploited prostitution.

Mr.

Maese received notice of the charge of conspiracy as part of a Pattern
of Unlawful Activity and the variance in the charging document did not
affect a substantial right of Mr. Maese.
5.

The Admission of Testimony Regarding a Sexual Assault was

Probative and Non-Prejudicial
Mr. Maese argues that the Court improperly admitted evidence during
the trial that one of his escorts had been the victim of a sexual assault
during a specific appointment as a Doll House escort.

Mr. Maese argues

that the inclusion of such evidence was prejudicial to him as it was not
relevant, and painted

"him as a party to the rape, after the fact."

Throughout the trial Mr. Maese's defense theory was that while sexual
activity

may

have

taken

place

between

his

escorts

and

Doll

House

clientele, he was wholly unaware of it. Thus, evidence of a conversation
between Mr. Maese and an escort about sexual activity occurring during
the course of a Doll House appointment was highly relevant and probative
on the issue of whether Mr. Maese knew that his escorts were engaging in
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sexual activity on their appointments with Doll House clients, and that
the

fees

and

activities.

tips

the

Doll

House

received

were

from

prostitution

The evidence adduced at trial was that a regular customer

of the Doll House expected sex during his appointment with an escort, and
paid for his non-consensual sex with the escort and that the Doll House
shared in the proceeds.

Thus, the evidence was relevant and probative

and not unfairly prejudicial.

Furthermore, the record was replete that

Mr. Maese did not engage in that act nor condone the non-consensual
nature

of

the

authorities.

act

and

further

offered

to

report

the

matter

to

(Testimony of Heather T.)

Even if the evidence was admitted erroneously, it was harmless.
Even

without

the

testimony

of

this

particular

event,

there

is

no

reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the case would have been any
different, given the volume of testimony adduced at trial.

This Court

finds that there was no substantial adverse effect upon Mr. Maese's
rights to warrant a new trial, and no good cause to arrest Judgment.
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for New
Trial is denied.
6.

The Admission of the Allison J. Letter was Probative and Not Unfairly

Prejudicial
Mr. Maese argues that the admission of the letter he drafted to
Allison J.'s parents accusing her of being a prostitute was irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial, and was evidence of other wrongs and therefore
should require an Arrest of Judgment or New Trial.

Again, the Court

notes that Mr. Maese's defense was grounded upon the premise that he was
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not aware of the prostitution his escorts were engaged in. Thus to now
argue that the admission of a letter, penned in his own hand, informing
the parents of one of his former escorts, that their daughter was engaged
in prostitution while in his employment is not relevant to the issue
before the Court is specious.

It is relevant and not unduly prejudicial.

Furthermore, the admission of such a letter was not offered as
evidence of any pertinent trait of character of Mr. Maese, although it
certainly tells a person about the nature of a person who would do such
a thing over an employment dispute.

The letter was not offered to show

action in conformity with a character trait of Mr. Maese, but rather to
demonstrate Mr. Maese's knowledge that Doll House escorts provided sex
acts in exchange for money.

To this end the letter detailed the conduct

Allison J. engaged in while an escort of the Doll House and contained
reviews from The Erotic Review which included detailed descriptions of
the sex acts she was willing to engage in for a fee as a Doll House
escort.

The letter further corroborated the testimony of Allison J. and

other Doll House escorts that Mr. Maese was aware of the revenue Allison
J. could generate for the Doll House and what exactly she had to do to
generate that income.

Accordingly, the letter's probative value was not

substantially outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it may have had
for Mr. Maese.

Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment/New

Trial is denied as to this issue.
7.

The State Did Not Violate Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure
Rule

16 of

the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure

outlines

the
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requirements of a prosecutor in disclosing to the defense
evidence obtained

in the prosecution of a case.

specified

The obligation to

produce such information is contingent upon request by a defendant and
is a continuing obligation which requires a prosecutor to disclose newly
acquired information.

State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994).

The issue Mr. Maese raises here is whether he received complete
information from the State as a result of testimony elicited either at
trial or contained in the Amended Information's probable cause statement
for which no interview or notes of such material was allegedly provided.
Those areas include:

(a)

reference

in

the probable

cause

statement

of

the Amended

Information attributed to Nicole F. that said "B*tch, you are
gonna have to make it work";
(b)

reference to trial testimony from Ms. Curtis that an escort
named Tatiana told Mr. Maese and M s . Curtis about explicit sex
acts

and

another

incident

wherein

Mr.

Maese

attended

a

bachelor party where Doll House escorts provided sex acts to
the celebrants.
The State responded by alleging that it supplied all material it had
related to statements it received from Nicole F. and that while a summary
of an interview of Nicole F. in the probable cause statement prepared by
Detective

Dan

Bartlett

("Detective

Bartlett")

does

not

contain

the

statement alleged to have been made by Nicole F., that statement "or one
substantially similar" is in the video recording of Nicole F.'s interview
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with Detective Bartlett, and that that video recorded

interview was

provided to Mr. Maese's counsel before trial. Accordingly, the Court
finds

no

merit

in

Mr.

Maese's

argument

that

the

State

withheld

information from him on this issue.
As to Ms. Curtis' statements, the State points to specific datestamped

documents

that

make

specific

conducted by Doll House escorts.

mention

of

bachelor

parties

The State further notes that the mere

fact that a witness may testify at trial to something does not suggest
that the State knew of such testimony before trial and failed to disclose
it.

It is not uncommon for witnesses to provide statements at trial

never made in interviews with counsel before trial. The State represents
it never interviewed an escort of the Doll House named Tatiana, nor did
they interview Ms. Curtis about Tatiana.

Accordingly, the Court finds

no merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point.
Mr. Maese fails to provide a basis for this Court to conclude that
the State withheld any information in violation of Rule 16.
8.

The State Did Not Engage in Prosecutorial Misconduct by Drawing

Reasonable

Inferences From

the Evidence and Questioning Mr. Maese's

Credibility
Mr. Maese

argues

that

the prosecutor

in this

case engaged

in

misconduct in his closing argument by arguing that Heather T. transferred
money to Mr. Maese from an incident of non-consensual sex and that Mr.
Maese's testimony in the area of "compliance" meetings with Doll House
escorts was not credible.
(a) Reasonable Inference
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STATE V. MAESE
A prosecutor may

draw reasonable

inferences

adduced at trial and argue them to the jury.
799 (Utah 1999).

from

the

evidence

State v. Bakalov, 979 P. 2d

The State noted in its argument that Heather T. never

actually said that she paid Mr. Maese the agency fee for the incident,
but that
evidence.8

it is a reasonable

inference which can be drawn from the

Several witnesses, including Heather T., testified that Mr.

Maese and Ms. Curtis routinely received $95 for every appointment a Doll
House escort handled and typically a tip on top of that.

Heather T.

testified that after she was sexually assaulted, she received $300 or
$400 as a tip, and also collected an agency fee.

She testified that she

returned back to the Doll House immediately after the assault.

It was

reasonable to infer from this testimony that she paid a Doll House fee
for the appointment.

Further, Heather T. testified that "when we would

return from the appointment we would go and meet back up with Tiffany and
Steve, we would give them the agency fee which was at least $100,...and
then the tip we would give to Tiffany because she is the phone person."
(See T2 at 166.)

Therefore, it was a reasonable inference that could be

drawn from the testimony, and argued to the jury.

The Court finds no

merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point, nor that it either had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Mr. Maese or that good
cause exists to arrest the Judgment or grant a new trial.
(b) Credibility of Mr, Maese

8

The State further asserts that Heather T. had so testified at the earlier preliminary
hearing and that the official transcript of the trial is inaudible in parts at this point in the
testimony as a result of the emotional state of the witness. (State Memo in Opposition, p. 29.)
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As to testimony a defendant may provide at trial, a prosecutor is
free to comment on credibility.

"When a defendant has testified during

trial, it is proper during a closing argument to comment on defendant's
credibility and appearance."

State v. Jimenez, 21 P. 3d 1142 at 1145

(Utah Ct. App 2001) . See also, State v. Larsen, 2005 Utah App 201, % 14,
113 P.3d

998; State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d

1275, 1283-84

(Utah 1989);

United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) (A
prosecutor may assert a witness

is not credible

if he supports his

assertion with admitted evidence.)
Here, the testimony Mr. Maese provided about regular "compliance"
meetings was contradicted by Mr. Maese's own witnesses, who testified
that only two meetings were held.

(State Memo in Opp. p. 25.)

the testimony from Ms. Curtis corroborated
meetings,

while

initially

held

on

a

the fact that

regular

basis, were

Indeed,

compliance
disbanded

altogether because of concerns about scaring the escorts from engaging
in sex acts.

(Tr. Tl 72-80)

Clearly, there was a discrepancy between

Mr. Maese's testimony and the evidence presented by other witnesses, for
which the credibility of the testimony could be challenged.
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for
new Trial is denied.
Sentencing of Mr. Maese is set for December 22, 2008, at noon.
Dated this

day of December, 2008.

RANDALL N. SKANCHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Addendum D

The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You
will contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case
and return a just and proper verdict.
25.

REACHING A VERDICT

This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must
agree. When you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work
is finished.
26.

HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT

When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict
form which corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to
return to court.
27.

W H A T HAPPENS A F T E R T H E VERDICT H A S B E E N R E P O R T E D

After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of
you about it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury
box and you may leave at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to
watch the rest of the proceedings, which should be quite brief.
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you
are not required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when
you don't want to do that, please tell the Court Clerk.

jurtnmins 6/15/00
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Addendum E

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs December 4, 2001
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AVIS NEAL
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. 97-09071
W. Fred Axley, Judge

No. W2001-00374-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 28, 2002

The Defendant, Avis Neal was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of rape of a child.
After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty years in the
Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in
admitting testimony concerning statements made by the victim to her mother, (2) the trial court's
reasonable doubt instruction was deficient, (3) the State failed to make a proper election, (4) the
evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the trial
court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for new trial due to the Defendant's out of court
contact with a juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
DAVID H. WELLES, J.,
G.HAYES, J., joined.

delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J. and DAVID

Christine W. Stephens, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Avis Neal.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General;
William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Julie Mosley, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
In early September 1996, the Defendant was living with Rochelle James, a long-time
girlfriend and mother of his three children. The oldest of the children, a ten year old daughter, is the
victim in this case. The victim testified that shortly after she started school in 1996, the Defendant
entered her room while her mother was at work and penetrated her vagina with his finger. The
victim pretended to be asleep during the assault, and told no one of the assault afterwards. A few
weeks later, the Defendant again entered the victim's room and penetrated her vagina, this time with
his penis. Again, the victim pretended to be asleep during the rape, and told no one afterwards. The
next day, Ms. James, the victim's mother, noticed a blood stain on the victim's panties and asked

if the victim had begun to menstruate. The victim said she did not know, and Ms. James explained
to her what to expect during menstruation. Between Thanksgiving and Christmas of the same year,
the Defendant entered the victim's room again and penetrated both her vagina and her anus with his
penis. The victim again pretended to be asleep during the rape. The victim testified that she told
no one because she feared her father would harm her or her family.
On January 22,1997, the Defendant again entered the victim's room, removed her from the
bed she was sharing with her younger brother and sister, placed her on the floor and penetrated her
vagina and anus with his penis. The next day, the victim recorded the attack in a diary she received
for Christmas. The diary entry for January 23, 1997 reads, "[m]y dad is a bitch because he put his
dick in me and he does - and I don't like my daddy."
In early February, the victim and Ms. James were arguing about a poor grade on the victim's
report card when the victim finally told Ms. James about the abuse. Ms. James testified that she took
the victim to a clinic to be examined. Ms. James further stated that she remembered the blood stain
on the victim's panties, and that she had asked the victim if she was menstruating. Ms. James
testified that the victim's grades dropped between September of 1996 and February of 1997, and that
she was punishing the victim for a bad report card on the day the victim told her about the abuse.
Sally DiScenza, a family nurse practitioner specializing in examining victims of sexual
assault and an expert in the field of forensic examination, examined the victim and found evidence
of penetration. The victim's perihymenal tissue was abnormally narrowed, indicating some form
of penetration. The victim's hymen tissue was also irregular, indicating trauma due to penetration.
The victim's vaginal opening was fifteen millimeters, much larger than the seven to ten millimeters
expected for a normal ten year old. The victim also had scarring around her anus, indicating
penetration. Ms. DiScenza testified that the victim's description of the Defendant's abuse was
consistent with the trauma to her vagina and anus.
Several friends of the Defendant testified regarding his reputation for truth and honesty.
Vannessa Bryson-Neal, the Defendant's wife, testified that she had been dating the Defendant
sporadically for about twelve years. Ms. Bryson-Neal stated that she has had several altercations,
some violent, with Ms. James about the Defendant. The Defendant testified that he dated both Ms.
James and Ms. Bryson-Neal at different times over the past twelve years, and he believed that Ms.
James was very jealous of Ms. Bryson-Neal. The Defendant further testified that he did not abuse
his daughter in any way, and that he could not explain her injuries.
VICTIM'S STATEMENTS TO MOTHER
The Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting testimony by Ms. James that
the victim told her about the abuse. The Defendant contends that this testimony was inappropriate
hearsay testimony admitted contrary to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 802. We agree that the trial
court erred in admitting the statement, but find the error to be harmless.
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Tennessee Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Rule 802 makes all hearsay inadmissible unless the statement falls
under one of the exceptions listed in Rule 803. See Tenn. R. Evid. 802, 803. At trial, the following
exchanged occurred during Ms. James' testimony:
[Assistant District Attorney]: And what made it end?
[Ms. James]:
My daughter came to me and told me that her father
had been messing with her.
[Defense Attorney]:
Objection.
The Court:
State your grounds. Sir?
[Defense Attorney]:
I object on the grounds of hearsay, Your Honor.
The Court:
Do you want to respond?
[Assistant District Attorney]: This is not going to the matter asserted. It's going to
show what she did and why she did it and her state of
mind.
The Court:
That's the exception. I will give an instruction to the
jury.
Immediately following the exchange, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction explaining
that they could consider the statement in light of Ms. James' actions after hearing the statement and
not for the truth of the statement itself. Ms. James then testified that her daughter told her that the
Defendant "took his thing out and stuck it in her."
The State argues that the testimony was elicited from Ms. James, not to prove that the rapes
actually occurred, but to provide the link between the victim's testimony and the actions of Ms.
James that followed. Therefore, the State asserts that the trial court properly overruled the
Defendant's objection because the statement in question was not hearsay. We must respectfully
disagree.
The testimony of Ms. James that the victim said the Defendant was "messing" with the
victim and "put his thing in her" can have no other effect but to corroborate and bolster the victim's
testimony that she was raped by the Defendant. In our view, the testimony was hearsay offered to
prove the truth of the statement, that the Defendant was sexually abusing the victim, and the trial
court erred in admitting the testimony. See Tenn. R. Evid. 801. However, in light of the proof
presented by the State, the limiting instruction given by the trial judge, and, specifically, the
testimony of the victim that the Defendant was abusing her, we conclude that Ms. James testimony
was cumulative of the proof already presented, and the trial court's error was clearly harmless. See
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52 (a); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23-24 (1967);
Phippsv. State. 474 S.W.2d 154,156 (1971); State v. Kennedy. 7 S.W.3d 58,69 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1999). This issue is without merit.
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REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in its reasonable doubt instruction to
the jury. In particular, he argues that the court's failure to issue the standard pattern jury instruction
containing "moral certainty" language lowered the standard of proof by which the State had to prove
him guilty of the offense. We must respectfully disagree.
The defendant asked that the trial court instruct the jury on reasonable doubt by use of
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03, which contains language that the jury must find the
defendant guilty to a moral certainty. The trial court refused the request, opting instead to use
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03(a), which provides as follows:
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and
impartial consideration of all the evidence in this case. It is not necessary that the
defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt, as absolute certainty of guilt
is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge. A reasonable doubt
is just that-a doubt that is reasonable after an examination of all the facts of this
case. If you find that the state has not proven every element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

The defendant complains that this instruction fails to adequately define the meaning of
reasonable doubt in the context of a criminal trial, allowing the jury to convict a defendant on less
proof than that required by the "moral certainty" language of Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03.
We have previously rejected similar challenges to the use of Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction
2.03(a). See, e ^ , State v. Ronald D. Coirell No. 03C01-9801-CC-00318, 1999 WL 812454, at *
8 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Oct. 8, 1999), perm, to appeal denied (Tenn. April 24, 2000)
(holding that T.P.L-Crim. 2.03(a) is consistent with principles of due process); State v. Tony Fason,
No. 02C01-9711-CR-00431, 1999 WL 588150, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Aug. 6, 1999),
perm, to appeal denied (Tenn. Feb. 7, 2000) (" 'Moral certainty' is not required language in a jury
instruction."); State v. Roscoe L. Graham. No. 02C01-9507-CR-00189, 1999 WL 225853, at *12
(Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, April 20, 1999) (holding that reasonable doubt instruction omitting
language of moral certainty is adequate). In State v. Melvin Edward Henning, No. 02CO1-9703CC-00126, 1997 WL 661455, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Oct. 24, 1997), we rejected a
challenge that Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03(a) was constitutionally deficient because it
did not contain "moral certainty" language:
Tennessee Pattern Instruction 2.03(a) tracks virtually identical language of pattern
reasonable doubt instructions approved by a majority of the federal circuits. See,
e.g.. United States v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1992), cert, denied,
508 U.S. 979 (1993); United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir.1989);
United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Kirbv,
838 F.2d 189,191-192 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Colon, 835 F.2d 27, 31-32
(2nd Cir.1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 980 (1988); United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d
620 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Alonzo, 681 F.2d 997, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert
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denied. 459 U.S. 1021 (1982); United States v. Robertson. 588 F.2d 575, 579 (8th
Cir.1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979). Moreover, the questioned language
"based upon reason and common sense" and "absolute certainty is not required" has
repeatedly been upheld as passing constitutional muster. See, e.g.. United States v.
Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir.1996), cert, denied.- U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1015 (1997);
United States v.Miller. 84 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied.-U.S.-. 117 S.Ct. 443
(1996) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holland. 116 F.3d 1353 (10th
Cir.1997); United States v. Campbell. 61 F.3d 976, 980-981 (1st Cir.1995), cert,
denied. — U.S. -—, 116 S.Ct. 1556 (1996); Hail, 854 F.2d at 1038- 1039; United
States v. Rahm. 993 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir.1993).
We do not find the instruction to be constitutionally deficient. We find no reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to permit conviction after anything but a process
of careful deliberation or upon less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue is without
merit.
ELECTION OF OFFENSE
The Defendant also contends that the State did not properly elect a specific incidence upon
which the State relied to support the rape charge. During the State's closing argument, the trial court
interrupted the State's attorney in order to remind him to make an election. The State informed the
trial court, and the jury during his argument, that the State would rely on the rape that occurred on
January 22,1997. Based upon this, the Defendant argues that he was not given notice of the charges
brought against him and that the instruction given by the trial court was insufficient to ensure
unanimity as to the specific illegal action of which the Defendant was convicted. We must
respectfully disagree.
The right to jury unanimity requires that the jury be unanimous as to the specific act which
the Defendant committed upon which their judgment rests. See State v. Hodge. 989 S.W.2d 717,
720 (Term. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Brown. 823 S.W.2d 576, 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). A
trial court has the duty of requiring the State to elect the particular act upon which it relies for
conviction and to instruct the jury so that the verdict of all jurors will be united as to one offense.
See Burlisonv. State. 501 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tenn.1973). When the State presents proof on many
offenses within an alleged time period, but neglects election, the jury is improperly allowed to "reach
into the brimming bag of offenses and pull out one for each count." Tidwell v. State. 922 S.W.2d
497, 501 (Tenn. 1996).
Furthermore, a conviction that is not unanimous as to the defendant's specific illegal action
is no more justifiable than a conviction by a jury that is not unanimous on a specific count. See
Hodge. 989 S.W.2d at 721. Where the State presents evidence of numerous offenses, the trial court
must augment the general jury unanimity instruction to insure that the jury understands its duty to
agree unanimously to a particular set of facts. Id A skeletal jury instruction of unanimity ferments
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a strong possibility of a composite jury verdict in violation of an appellant's constitutional rights.
Id
Pursuant to a pretrial motion, the Defendant received a Bill of Particulars from the State that
detailed the five specific incidents that the State sought to prove at trial. Included in the Bill of
Particulars was the vaginal and anal penetration that occurred on January 22, 1997. Based on the
Bill of Particulars provided the Defendant by the State, we find that the Defendant had adequate
notice of the specific conduct for which he was to be prosecuted.
Furthermore, the instruction given by the trial court was sufficient to ensure that the verdict
returned by the jury was unanimous with regard to the specific conduct of the Defendant. The trial
court's instruction stated
The alleged victim, [name omitted] in indictment number 97-09071 has
testified to several alleged sexual encounters with the defendant. The State must
make an election as to which particular offense the Jury must consider in arriving at
your verdict.
In indictment number 97-0971 charging the defendant with the offense of
Rape of a Child the Court charges you that you may consider the testimony
concerning the alleged rape that occurred at the family's apartment on January 22,
1997.
You may also consider all of the alleged incidents that occurred before and
after that date in arriving at your verdict.
Additionally, the State's attorney informed the jury during closing arguments that their verdict must
be unanimous in regard to a specific instance of child rape.
There were at least five [instances of abuse] that [the victim] named. You
have to all agree on one. That's why its unanimous. You have to be unanimous
about not only that he's been raping her, but that this particular rape occurred. Does
that make sense to everybody?
And I have to pick the one that you have to agree on, yes or no.
Now there are five different incidents that she described. Some of them she
was able to date very specifically. Some of them she was not able to date very
specifically.
And you can consider all of that when you determine whether or not you think
she is telling the truth and how reasonable it is to believe and how it fits into
conjunction with the physical evidence as far as her injuries.
But I'm going to make an election, which is what they call it, again, another
technical term, of that January 22nd, 1997 rape.
Okay. Now you can talk about the others and consider that all together as part
of the proof, but you have to all agree that that particular incident occurred.
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The trial court's instruction concerning the prosecution's election of the January 22, 1997
rape, together with the prosecutor's comments during closing argument, were sufficient to ensure
the unanimity of the jury's verdict.1 Therefore, this issue is without merit.
SUFFICIENCY
Next, the Defendant contends that, due to the lack of DNA evidence linking him to the rape
of the victim, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
We must respectfully disagree.
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that "[findings of guilt in criminal
actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support
the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Evidence is sufficient if, after
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Smith. 24 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000). In addition, because
conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of
guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient.
See McBeev. State. 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963): see also State v. Buggs. 995 S.W.2d 102,
105-06 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Evans. 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Tuggle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).
In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State "the strongest legitimate
view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn
therefrom." Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914; see also Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 279. The court may not "reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence" in the record below. Evans, 838 S.W.2d at 191; see also Buggs,
995 S.W.2d at 105. Likewise, should the reviewing court find particular conflicts in the trial
testimony, the court must resolve them in favor of the jury verdict or trial court judgment. Tuggle,
639 S.W.2d at 914. All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be
given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact, not the appellate courts.
See State v.Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788,795 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,623 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1987).
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon to convict him, the Defendant
contends that, without DNA evidence, no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We disagree. The victim testified that the Defendant penetrated her vagina and
anus with either his finger or his penis on numerous occasions. After one such occasion, the victim's
mother noticed a blood stain in the victim's underwear. The victim recorded her anger regarding her
father's assaults in her diary. Finally, Ms. DiScenza, a family nurse practitioner specializing in

Clearly the better practice is for the trial judge to give the jury an enhanced jury unanimity instruction advising
that the jury must unanimously agree that the facts relied upon for the conviction relate to the particular offense elected
by the State.
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examining victims of sexual assault and an expert in the field of forensic examination, examined the
victim and discovered injuries to the victim's vagina and anus that could only be caused by some
form of penetration. Ms. DiScenza testified that the type of injuries she discovered were consistent
with the victim's description of the Defendant's abuse.
We find ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. This issue is without merit.
CONTACT WITH A JUROR
Finally, the Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial due to his alleged contact with
a juror during his trial. At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial, the Defendant presented the
testimony of a juror from his trial. The juror stated that during the trial of the Defendant, she and
the Defendant rode on the same elevator. The juror testified that she was never alone on the elevator
with the Defendant, and she did not communicate with the him in any way, however, the incident
frightened her. The juror mentioned the incident to two other jurors immediately after it happened,
but the incident was never mentioned after that.
It is the law in Tennessee that an unexplained sequestered juror conversation with a third
party is good cause for a new trial. See State v. BlackwelL 664 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tenn.1984).
However, when a jury is not sequestered, the validity of a verdict is questionable only when there
is extraneous prejudicial information or any outside influence brought to bear on a juror. Id. In the
present case, the jury was not sequestered, and the burden is on the Defendant's to show that the
juror in question received prejudicial information or was subjected to outside influence.
In Blackwell the Supreme Court adopted Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and
defined the type of evidence admissible from a juror to impeach a jury verdict. This holding,
subsequently established as Rule 606(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, prohibits a juror from
giving testimony on any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations
or the effect of anything upon a juror's mind or emotion as influencing his or her vote except that
a juror may testify on the question of whether any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury' s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror.
If it is shown that one or more jurors has been exposed to extraneous prejudicial information
or improper influence, there arises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, and the burden then shifts
to the prosecution to explain the conduct or to demonstrate the harmlessness of it. See BlackwelL
664 S.W.2d at 689; State v. Young. 866 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Term. Crim. App., 1992). In order to
shift the burden to the prosecution to demonstrate the harmlessness of the communication with the
jury, the threshold question is whether the statement communicated to the jury was prejudicial to the
Defendant. In the present case, there is no evidence that a communication actually occurred.
Without evidence of a communication, there can be no evidence that the communication prejudiced
the Defendant. We cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion for New
Trial. This issue is without merit.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court's error in allowing statements made to
the victim's mother by the victim into evidence was harmless, the trial court properly instructed the
jury regarding reasonable doubt, the State properly elected the offense that occurred on January 22,
1997, the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and the trial court did not err in denying the
Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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